LALA BAIJNATH PROSAD Vs. NURSINGDAS GUZRATI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On 16th of August, 1930, the Respondent Narsingdas Guzrati obtained from Lort-Williams J., sitting on the Original Side of this Court, a decree for money against 38 defendants. That decree was signed by S. R. Das, J. on 10th September, 1943 and a certified copy of it was obtained by the decree-holder on the following day. On 4th of August, 1953, the decree-holder applied for the execution of his decree. Not unnaturally, an objection was at once raised on behalf of some of the judgment-debtors that execution of the decree could no longer be had, because the twelve years' time allowed by Article 183 of the Limitation Act had long expired. The decree-holder's reply was that he had still the right to execute his decree because, according to him, in computing the period of limitation, he was entitled to exclude three periods of time which would bring his application within twelve years. He also contended that there had been acknowledgments of liability which had given a fresh start to limitation. The exclusions claimed by the decree-holder were of the period between the date of the decree and the date on which a certified copy of it had been obtained, a period during which execution of the decree was said to have remained stayed under an injunction and a further period during which execution was Said to have remained further stayed under a second injunction. There can be no question that if any of those periods could be excluded, the application for execution would be within time. P. B. Mukherji, J., before whom the matter came up for hearing, allowed the exclusions claimed with some slight modifications, but he did not decide finally the question of the acknowledgments, though the inclination of his opinion was clearly in the decree-holder's favour. In the result, he over-ruled the objection of the judgment-debtors and directed the execution to proceed. Against that decision, twelve of the judgment-debtors have appealed.

(2.) There are no disputed questions of fact. The dates relating to the decree as well as the dates and the scope of the injunctions are matters of record and so are the dates and the content's of the alleged acknowledgments. The only questions involved in the case concern the effect on limitation of events which admittedly happened.

(3.) Some reference to the nature of the decree will have to be made later, but it is not relevant to the first of the points taken by the decree-holder. That point is not accurately stated by saying that in computing the period if limitation, he was entitled to exclude the period between the date of the decree and the date on which a certified copy of it was obtained by him. As the learned Judge has himself pointed out, Section 12 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications for execution. In the case of such applications, there could be no question of excluding "the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree", even if a copy was required to be filed along with the application. What the decree-holder really contended and what the learned Judge has really held is that it is inherent in the very words of Article 183, read with the Rules of this Court, that the period of limitation prescribed by it does not commence to run till a certified copy of the decree or order, sought to be executed, has been obtained. The only question arising out of the first point of the decree-holder is whether that view is right.