RAMESH DEY Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Bankura in Sessions Trial No. 9(8) of 2001 corresponding to Sessions Case No. 11(3) of 2000 convicting the appellants viz. Ramesh Dey, Mrityunjay Digar and Jayanta Santra under Section 302/34 and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each in default S.I. for six months. The appellants have also been convicted under Sections 324/34, I.P.C. and sentenced to suffer RI. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each in defaulT to Suffer S.I. for two months with the direction that both the Sentences shall run concurrently. One Tarapada Mondal lodged complaint with the Kotalpur P.S. alleging that on 27- 5-97 at about 9.00 p.m. his sister Kumari Padma Mondal, his mother Sudhamayee Mondal and his aunt Sujata Dey with her little son Suman Dey aged about 4 years sat in the courtyard of the house. At that time the Informant heard shout from the courtyard and after reaching the spot he found that his sister Padma Mondal and his mother Sudhamayee were lying on the ground in restless condition. Sujata Dey, the informant's aunt, told him that in order to kill Padma, the accused Ramesh Dey brought a glass full of acid and hurled it at Padma and ran away. As a result, Padma, informant's mother and aunt and the little boy sustained injury. They were admitted to Arambag-Sub-Divisional Hospital. It has also been stated in the F.I.R. that before this incident Ramesh Dey on another occasion hurled acid at Padma. After receipt of the complaint, the P.S. Case bearing No. 20 of 1997 dated 28-5-97 was started under Section 326/307, I.P.C. Victim Padma died in the hospital after six days. After completion of investigation the charge-sheet was submitted. The learned trial Judge after considering the materials on record was pleased to frame the charges under Sections 302/34, I.P.C. and 326/34, I.P.C. against the accused persons to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed for trial.

(2.) In this case the prosecution has examined as many as 16 P.Ws. including the informant, the neighbouring witnesses, the brother of the deceased, the sister of the deceased, the injured Sudhamayee Mondal i.e. the mother of the deceased, the autopsy Surgeon and the I.O.

(3.) The learned trial Judge upon consideration of the evidence on record was pleased to pass the impugned judgment of convicti on and sentence holding that it was proved beyond any manner of doubt that the injured persons sustained acid burn injuries and that the injuries were grievous in nature. The learned trial Judge observed that from the evidence it was proved that on earlier occasion Ramesh teased Padma in a very uncouth manner for which Padma slapped and assaulted Ramesh. It has also been observed by the learned trial Judge that from the evidence of witnesses it was proved that Ramesh expressed his desire to marry Padma though the accused person was aware that he was married. The learned trial Judge also observed that the accused persons jointly with the common intention proceeded through the road which was situated by the side of the P.O. and getting the scope of having no boundary wall or fencing within the P.O., they got such chance to go through that P.O. in such a mood as if, they were proceeding to the marriage party of Sambhu Digar and taking such scope Ramesh threw the acid aiming at Padma and, as a result, it touched the bodies of all the persons who were present there. It was observed that from the evidence it was proved that Jayanta Santra was aware of the fact about the throwing of acid and Mrityunjay was also present in that assembly. The learned trial Judge observed that on overall assessment of the evidence on record there was no ground to disbelieve the evidence of the P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 8, P.W. 9, P.W. 10, P.W. 11 and P.W. 12. The learned trial Judge after considering all the materials on record found no difficulty in passing the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence.