ORIENT BEVERAGES LTD Vs. APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The order dated December 13, 1995, purported to have been passed under Section 269UC of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by respondent No. 1, is under challenge in this petition. Under this order, the statement furnished by the petitioner in Form No. 37-I was not found valid and legal in the eyes of law by respondent No. 1 and as such it was decided that such a statement could not be acted upon by that authority with all adverse consequences that would follow against the petitioner. Initially, there was some dispute regarding the purported exercise of the power under which the impugned order dated December 13, 1995, was passed by respondent No. 1. Initially, it was made out that such order was passed under Section 269UC(3) of the Income-tax Act, but this mistake was ultimately rectified by respondent No. 1, vide its communication dated February 7, 1996. The dispute regarding mentioning of the section under which the order was passed or its subsequent rectification is not relevant or material for the disposal of this petition.

(2.) It appears that the petitioner which is a company carrying on business in real estate ownership and development amongst other activities, entered into a written agreement with the persons mentioned in paragraph 3 of the petition on December 23, 1991, for developing a property comprising land and building commonly known as Anandapur House on S. P. Verma Road, P. S. Kotwali, Patna, in the State of Bihar. Various terms and conditions set out in the agreement allegedly executed on December 23, 1991, are not required to be stated because this was not relevant for our determination. What is, however, required to be stated is that on September 14, 1995, the petitioner allegedly entered into an agreement in writing with respondent No. 3 at Calcutta whereby it agreed to sell to respondent No. 3, the entire second floor of the purported building measuring about 10,050 SBA and car parking space in the said building for a total consideration of Rs. 64,35,000.

(3.) Under Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax act, this agreement allegedly entered into between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 was required to be filed before respondent No. 1 in the prescribed form (Form No. 37-I). It is the petitioner's case that in compliance with the requirement of law it filed Form No. 37-I to respondent No. 1. Annexure "D" of the petition is the copy of a receipt of an acknowledgment showing that such form was received in the office of respondent No. 1. Vide a communication dated November 23, 1995, respondent No. 1 called upon the petitioner to furnish certain details on or before December 11, 1995, in order to satisfy respondent No. 1, about passing appropriate orders in terms of Section 269UC of the Act. It is not disputed by the parties that the details asked for vide the aforesaid communication were not received by respondent No. 1 before December 11, 1995. Consequently, without receiving such details respondent No. 1 passed the order on December 13, 1995, which, as noticed at the outset, has been impugned in this petition. At the outset, the learned advocate for the respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the jurisdiction of this court to entertain this petition. Two judgments of the Supreme Court have been referred to and relied upon apart from some other cases (which are not relevant). One is the case of State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, and the other is Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu. Incidentally, in both these judgments the orders passed by this court were challenged in the apex court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in that court to entertain these petitions, because the cause of action had not accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. In the case of Swaika Properties, the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1950, was the subject-matter of controversy because in terms of Section 52(1) of the Act a notification issued by the Government of Rajasthan was under challenge by the petitioners in the High Court. After analysing various facts, their Lordships observed that since service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act was not an integral part of the cause of action, no part of the cause of action could be deemed to have accrued in the State of West Bengal. The following portion may be quoted with advantage (at page 1292 of AIR 1985 SC) :