ARUNDHUTI NAN Vs. P M DARYANANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IT is high time that we seriously remind ourselves about the limited and restricted scope of our revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure a rather liberal use of this jurisdiction had added a great deal to our present forensic woes, has inundated our courts with unmerited litigations resulting in staggering arrears and has held up disposal of numberless cases in the subordinate courts for too long. The section, however, as pointed out by the Privy Council in T. A. Bala Krishna Udayer (AIR 1917 Privy Council 71 at 74), quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Keshordeo Chamaria (AIR 1953 S. C. 28 at 27), "applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it" and "is not directed to conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved".

(2.) CLAUSES (a) and (b) of Section 115 (1) of the Code of civil Procedure providing for the invocation of the revisional jurisdiction in a case where the subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction when there is none or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction where there is one, do not present much difficulties in their application. But it is Clause (c)of Section 115 (1), couched in rather wide and indefinite language and providing that the High Court may also exercise revisional jurisdiction when the subordinate court "appears to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity", that has led the various High courts to go on enlarging the jurisdiction beyond permissible limits on the assumption that all cases of gross errors of law or facts would come within the ambit of this Clause (c)and such a view has very often been adhered to inspite of its repeated repudiation by the Privy Council and the Supreme court during all these years spreading over more than a century.

(3.) AS early as in 1884, Sri Bares Peacock, while construing the analogous provisions of Sections 622 of the Code of Civil procedure 1877, pointed out in Amir Hassan Khan (ILR 11 Calcutta 6 at 8) that if the Court had jurisdiction to decide a case, then "even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity". Now whether one refers to this Amir Hassan Khan (supra) of 1884 or to the later Privy Council decision in t. A. Bala Krishna Udeyar (supra) of 1917 or to the much later privy Council decision in N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar of 1949 (AIR 1949 Privy Council 1561, or whether one refers to the supreme Court decision in Keshordeo Chamaria (supra) of 1952 or to the much later decision of the Supreme Court in Vora abbasbhai of 1963 (AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1341), in Pandurang dhondi of 1966 (AIR 1966 SC 153) or in D. L. F. Housing and construction Company of 1969) (AIR 1971 Supreme Court 2 324 )or to yet later decision of the Supreme Court in M. L. Sethi of 1 972 (AIR 1972 SC 2379) or in Sher Singh of 1978 (AIR 1978 sc 1341), one will find the law to be the same and the position in law will appear to be firmly established that the mere fact that the decision is erroneous in fact or in law does not amount to illegal or irregular exercise of jurisdiction and that while exercising the revisional jurisdiction it is not competent for the High Court to correct errors of fact or law, however gross or manifest, unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself.