UNION OF INDIA Vs. MOZAMMIL HAQUE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Union of India and others have preferred these two appeals along with applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 against two judgments and orders of the learned trial Judge respectively dated 9. 10. 85 and 17. 9. 85.

(2.) MR. Kabir, appearing on behalf of the respondent petitioner has submitted that these appeals having been presented after the establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal by notification under sub-section 2 of section 14 of the administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 , this court has no longer any jurisdiction to entertain these appeals or the applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in presenting the instant appeals. Accordingly to Mr. Kabir, the proviso to section 29 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 has preserved jurisdiction to this court hear and dispose of appeals pending of the date on which the notification under section 14 (2) of the said Act had come into force. The appeals before us were not pending on the appointed day but, as already stated, have been presented after the establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 read with Article 223a of the constitution of India.

(3.) THE short point before us is whether even after the appeal against the decision of the trial judge disposing of a writ application can be filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Having given our anxious consideration are unable to accept the submission raised on behalf of the respondents that the Administrative Tribunal Act,1985 has either expressly or by necessary implication, abolished the right to prefer an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters patent against the judgement and order passed by a Single Judge before the establishment of the central Administrative Tribunal. The learned advocates appearing on both sides have not disputed the legal position succinctly summarised by S. R. Das. CJ. in paragraph 23 of his judgement in the case of Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subhiah Choudhary and Ors. reported in AIR 1957 SC 540. The second proposition enunnciated by the learned Chief dure but was substantive right. The third proposition laid down was that the institution of a suit carried down with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force were preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. The fourth proposition was that the right of appeal was a vested right such a right to enter the superior court accrued to the litigant and existed as on and from the date the lis commenced and although be actually exercised when the adverse judgement was pronounced such right was to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevailed at the date of its or at the date of the appeal.