RAMAPATI DAS Vs. DR. NALINI RANJAN SANTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule is directed against the order of Sri S.K. Banerjee, Munsif, 1st Court of Midnapore, striking out the defence against delivery of possession filed by the defendant-petitioner. The order is impugned as without any basis and in clear contravention of the provisions of S- 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The present petitioner while objecting to the plaintiff's petition under Sec. 17(3) of the Act has made an application under Sec. 17(2A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 supported by an application under Sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in making the application under Sec. 17(2) read with Sec. 17(2A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

(2.) Mr. Panda appearing in support of the Rule contends that the learned court below was wrong in rejecting the application under Sec. 5 and the application under Sec. 17(2) and (2A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. It has been contended that Indian Limitation Act would apply to an application under Sec. 17(2A) of the Act. The relevant facts are as follows:-

(3.) Thus the power of the court under Sec. 17(2A) is, by express provision in Sec. 17(2B) controlled and is directed to be exercised subject to the conditions imposed in Sec. 17 sub-section (2B). The condition precedent for exercise of the said power is incorporated in the provisions of Sec. 17, sub-section (2B). It is therefore, not a question of merely applying the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Panda learned Counsel for the petitioner, relies upon a decision reported in 76 CWN 486, M/s. Pokarmal Gurudayal Vs. Sagarmal Bengani , where it has been held that though the provisions of Sec. 17B(1) provides for making of an application thereunder a period of 60-days from the relevant date, this period may be s extended and an application thereunder beyond the period can be condoned by applying Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. It is the established principle of law that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act could apply for condonation of delay where there is any period of limitation provided in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. But, as I have already observed, it is not a question of limitation in the instant case-The power of the court under Sec. 17(2A) which is invoked on behalf of the petitioner is to be exercised by express provisions under the statute on the conditions laid down in Sec. 17(2B) of the Act itself. The application under Sec. 17(2A) cannot be entertained unless the said condition as imposed by sub-section (2B) is fulfilled. The court has, therefore, no power under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act to extend the period in the absence of fulfilment of the condition under Sec. 17(2B). The trial court has, accordingly, very rightly dismissed the application of the petitioner under Sec. 17(2A) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.