LAWS(CAL)-1966-5-2

B K LALA Vs. R C DUTT

Decided On May 23, 1966
B.K.LALA Appellant
V/S
R.C.DUTT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this Rule Mr. Swayambhu Gopal Mazumdar, Barrister-at-Law and Mr. R.C. Dutt. Solicitor were called upon to show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of the Court of the Judge. Additional Special Court. Calcutta. The Rule was issued on the 30th November, 1965 by this Court on perusal of the report made by Sri B.K. Lala, Judge. Additional Special Court, Calcutta. hereinafter called the "Judge" He sent a report to the Registrar. Appellate Side of this Court on 27th September 1965 to the effect that the aforesaid persons should stand trial for contempt of Court for the reasons stated in this report. It is said that on the 22nd September 1965, he was served with a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure at his chamber at about 1 p.m. from the Solicitor Sri R.C. Dutt of 7 Old Post Office Street. Calcutta threatening him on behalf of his client Mr. S.G. Mazumdar Barrister-at-Law with a suit against him for damages for a sum of Rs. 5,10,000/- only Mr. S.G. Mazumder hereinafter called the contemner, was appointed senior Public Prosecutor in the Calcutta Corporation Petrol Theft Conspiracy Case (Case No. 12 of 1959, State v. P.K. Das & others) before the Additional Special Court, Calcutta. He conducted the case on behalf of the prosecution. On the 16th of December 1965 judgment was delivered in the above case by the Judge and on the following date, that is on the 17th December 1965 there was a publication of a short report of the judgment in the Statesman and Hindusthan Standard. On the 22nd September 1965 as stated before, the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was served upon the Judge. The Judge states in his report that there was an allegation in the notice that during the trial the contemner was dealt with in such manner which was hardly consistent with fairness and that he had prejudice against him and it was further stated that as a result it culminated in his severe condemnation in the judgment given by the Judge in that case. It was also asserted that the remarks made by the Judge were definitely beyond the scope of his duty and jurisdiction as Judge and had all along been known to him to be so. In this notice it was also suggested that there was abuse of the Court's power throughout the hearing of the trial and that the Judge acted unfairly and with prejudice, bias and improper motives against the contemner in the course of his judicial function. In the report it is clearly stated by the Judge that the enormous amount claimed as damages clearly indicates that the threat had been given to terrorise the Court and create a feeling of embarrassment in the mind of the Court in the discharge of its duties thereby preventing him from doing justice freely and unhesitatingly and impairing the confidence of actual and prospective litigants and thereby interfering with the administration of justice. In his estimation the notice amounts to gross contempt of Court and the fact that the allegations are contained in a notice sent by the Solicitor under Section 80 C.P.C. does not prevent them from being contumacious.

(2.) Before the disposal of the Rule the contemner instituted a suit on the 15th December 1965 in the Original Side of this Court being suit No 2197 of 1965. It may also be noted that, an appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Judge is still pending before this Court.

(3.) Before going into the merits of the arguments advanced by learned counsel appearing for both the parties, it is necessary to give in brief as to what findings were made by the Judge with regard to the conduct of business by the contemner Public Prosecutor. The trial had a long-drawn existence and with great hesitation the learned Judge has remarked that it was his duty to bring to the notice of the authorities one of the reasons which was responsible for protracted trial of the case. He said that in cases like this the Public Prosecutors often do not take sufficient care to sift the evidence, as they should by all means produce the only best evidence to prove the cases; but often without any such sifting the entire mass of evidence, unusually bulky, is produced which makes the case appear much bigger than what it actually is. The instant case was one of the most glaring examples of the same. Its duration was unnecessarily prolonged with the result that huge expenditure of the State, which could easily have been avoided was incurred and valuable time of the Court was wasted. Thereafter he cites some instances which caused the delay by adducing unnecessary evidence in this case. In his judgment he was not unmindful of the provisions of Section 114 (g) of the Indian Evidence Act and has made a remark that he was unable to shut out the evidence, lest the defence thought that if those evidence were adduced the prosecution case would have been falsified. He also has stated in that portion of the judgment some examples as to what, constituted absolutely unnecessary evidence for proving the prosecution case and why he could not control the production of unnecessary evidence and he was of opinion that it was the primary duty of the learned Public Prosecutor to control. He has also made the following remarks: