(1.) We think that in all the circumstances of the case the order of the 12th of March last ought not to be sustained. It is true that the order has spent itself, because what was directed by it was only that the appellant should hand over the prints of the film & the relevant publicity materials to the Indira Cinema by 11 o'clock of the 13th of March last. When the appellants lodged their appeal & moved for an interim stay of the order, it appeared to us that there were 'prima facie' grounds for thinking that exceptions to the order could justly be taken and accordingly we granted an Interim stay. The result has been that the 13th of March has come and gone and so far as the particular order passed on that date is concerned, whether it is sustained or held to have been wrongly passed, is of no practical consequence to anyone. It has, however been represented to" us that the basis of the order nevertheless remains and it is necessary and proper that we should express our views thereon, as it may ground another order. Since all the parties interested in the matter addressed us at considerable length, we consider it right that we should express our views briefly on the order complained of.
(2.) Mr. Meyer, who appeared for the appellants, framed his complaint against the order on the basis that it was a mandatory injunction. On that basis he argued that there were several reasons why the order could not have been made at all or at least ought not to have been made. He recalled the frame of the suit in which the order had been made and the form of the prayers contained in the plaint and contended that the plaintiffs not having asked for any specific performance in the present suit but having asked only for injunctions of a restrictive character, were not entitled to obtain an interim order of mandatory injunction, directing the appellants to deliver the prints to them. There could not be, it was said, an 'ad interim' order of a positive character in aid of a negative injunction which was ,the only permanent injunction asked for in the suit. It was next contended that there were also several other questions which would have to be carefully examined before any injunction of a mandatory character could be granted and those matters having received no consideration the grant of the injunction had not been proper. The appellants, it was said, wished to contend that the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim delivery of the prints on the basis of the contract relied upon, they not having been ready & willing to perform their part of the contract. They wished also to contend that the prayers in the present suit were barred under the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil P. C. These, it was said, were serious questions which any Court would have to go into even for the purpose of considering whether a 'prima facie' case for a mandatory injunction existed and the learned Judge had made the order without applying his mind to those questions or giving an opportunity to the appellants to make their sub-missions on them. The main argument of Mr. Meyer, however, was that there could not be or at least ought not to have been a mandatory injunction of an 'ad interim' character, in view of toe prayers contained in the plaint, and also the terms of an 'ad interim' injunction previously granted and still subsisting.
(3.) Mr. Dey, who appeared for the Indira Cinema, contended, though somewhat feebly, that even regarded as a mandatory Injunction, the order had been made with jurisdiction and had been properly made. As far as I could understand him he did not ultimately persist in that contention, but based his defence of the order on another ground to which I shall advert in a moment.