AJAY KUMAR TARAFDAR Vs. APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Court: The writ petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the appropriate authority, under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, dated May 13th, 2004 directing that the property in question would be deemed to be purchased by the Central Government for Rs.l 1,10.000/-, being the amount equal to the amount of apparent consideration.

(2.) The petitioner and the priyate respondents entered into a sale agreement dated August 31st, 1987. In terms of the agreement the immovable property located at 50, Radhanath Choudhury Road, Kolkata- 700 015 (land measuring about: ninety cottahs together with a one storied brick built building and authouses with covered shades and a water reservoir) was to be sold by the private respondents to the petitioner for Rs.11,10,000/-. On September 14th, 1987 the parties to the agreement submitted the requisite statement in form 37-I before the appropriate authority. By the pre-emptive purchase order under section 269UD(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated November 19th, 1987 the appropriate authority ordered purchase of the property by the Central Government for Rs. 11, 10.000/-. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner moved this Court by filing writ petition No.5508 of 1987; a stay order was made.

(3.) Challenging the validity of the provisions of chapter XXC, inserted in the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1986, civil Writ Petition No. 2821 of 1986 (C.B. Gautam v. Union of India & Ors.) was filed before the Delhi High Court. That writ petition was transferred to the Apex Court. By Judgment and order dated November 17th, 1992 (reported at 199 ITR 530) that writ petition was allowed by their Lordships of the Apex Court. Their Lordships held that a compulsory purchase order under section 269UD(1) could not have been made unless the parties to the agreement had been given opportunity of showing cause and hearing. An application for clarification was moved by the Union of India. By order dated November 27th, 1992 that application was disposed of. Their Lordships said, "We, accordingly, clarify by this supplemental direction to be read as part of the Judgment that, in respect of cases other than that of the petitioner, C.B. Gautam, the period of two months referred to in section 269UD(1) shall be reckoned with reference to the date of disposal of each of such pending matters either before this Court or before the High Courts, as the case may be. Where, however, the stay orders inhibiting the authorities from taking further proceedings are vacated, the period referred to in the said section 269UD(I) shall be reckoned with reference to the date of such vacating of the stay orders. This clarification and further direction shall be supplemental to and be treated as parts of the main Judgment."