ALGUDDIN MALLICK Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this writ application the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to make payment of all the dues payable to him. The petitioner admittedly had entered into a contract with the respondent No. 1. Pursuant thereto work order was issued in his favour on 5-2-90. According to the petitioner he had made various allegations with regard to the alleged breach of contract on the part of the respondent. The petitioner has furnished the particular of his claim in paragraph 17 of the writ application which reads thus :

(2.) The very basis of the petitioner's claim arises out of contract qua contract. More so it is pure money claim and thus in my opinion, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents have committed a breach of contract which cannot be entertained in a writ application.

(3.) However in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court of India it may be held that when a contract has been terminated mala fide or in violation of the principle of natural justice, a writ application may be maintainable. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of 1994 (1) Calcutta Law Times 138 (Abuzar v. Union of India); l994 (3) SCC 324 and 1994 (3) SCC 552 The Supreme Court in the case reported in 1994 (2) SCC 466 has held that no writ application is maintainable with regard to a pure money claim. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has strongly relied upon a decision in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Steel Crackers, reported in 1994 (2) CLT 222 The main prayer of the petitioner in that writ application was in relation to delivery of 63,830 MT Cast Rolls and 246.25 MT of Steel Rolls in accordance with the sale orders. The learned Judge held that the Writ Court can interfere with a contractual matter if governmental agency acts arbitrarily or in unreasonable manner. The learned Judge however held in paragraph 30 of the said judgment as follows :-