SHEIK BASED Vs. SRIDHAR CHANDRA BERA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule arises out of a proceeding really under Sec. 12A(1) of the "West Bengal Bargadars (Amendment) Ordinance, 1954. The application, which was originally filed by the alleged bargadar, who is the Petitioner before me, purported to be one under Sub-section (2) of Section 12A. It was in the nature of a complaint, more or less, in the terms of that Sub-section The complainant was examined by the learned Sub-divisional Officer and some evidence was taken. The matter was then sent to the President of the local Union Board for enquiry. Thereafter it appears, the Petitioner prayed to the Sub-divisional Officer to take action under Sub-section (1) of Sec. 12A and asked for leave to treat his original application under Sec. 12A(2) as one under Sub-section (1). The proceedings under Sub-section (1) were thus started. Notice was given to the opposite party (owner) and eventually, the learned Sub-divisional Officer allowed the Petitioner's application. This was on Oct. 23, 1954. In the meantime, on Sept. 23, 1954, the West Bengal Bargadars Amendment Act, 1954. had come into force and in Sec. 12A(2)(i) of this amending Act, a provision was made for revision of the Sub-divisional Officer's order by the learned District Judge. The opposite party, against whom the learned Sub-divisional Officer had passed his order in the present case on Oct. 23, 1954, applied under this new provision to the learned District Judge for revision of the said order and that revision application eventually succeeded. From this order of the learned District Judge, allowing the opposite party's revision application, the present Rule was obtained by the Petitioner.

(2.) The first point that has been urged in support of this Rule is that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction in this case to interfere with the order of the learned Sub-divisional Officer. It is contended that Sec. 12A(2)(i) of the new Act (West Bengal Bargadars Amendment Act, 1954) can have no application to the present proceedings which were instituted long before the enactment of the said amending Act and, at the time of initiation whereof, there was no provision for any revision to the learned District Judge from the order of the learned Sub-divisional Officer. There seems to be no answer to this argument. It is well established that right of appeal and right of revision are substantive rights. Statutes, conferring them, can have no retrospective operation and cannot affect pending proceedings in the absence of provisions, express or implied, to the contrary. In the amending Act of 1954, there is no such contrary provision. The power of revision, conferred upon the District Judge by this amending Act, would therefore, be available only in cases which are instituted after the coming into operation of this Act. That power cannot be invoked or exercised in relation to cases which had been instituted prior to the said amending Act.

(3.) I would, accordingly, accept the Petitioner's argument and set aside the order of the learned District Judge upon the view that the revision application before him was not maintainable in low and he had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. That, however, is not the end of the matter. As the case is before me under Art. 227 of the Constitution, I deem it my duty to consider the propriety of the learned Sub-divisional Officer's order.