SHANICHARI DEBI Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application in the nature of Habeas Corpus under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for an order for the release of a detenu Raghunath Prosad who has been ordered to be detained under Section 3(a)(ii) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Raghunath was arrested on October 22, 1954, and an order of the District Magistrate, 24 -Parganas, dated September 14, was served on him specifying the grounds of his detention. There were three grounds mentioned in the order of the District Magistrate. The first was that at a meeting of the workers of the Titagarh Paper Mill held on September 11, 1954, at Matkal Maidan, Raghunath had in the course of a speech delivered by him at the meeting abused the Management in filthy and threatening language, and had threatened that whoever would resume work without the consent of the Union leaders would be beaten severely and killed; and that at the termination of the meeting a procession of about 500 persons was led by Raghunath along with others shouting objectionable slogans. The second ground was that in the evening of September 13, 1954, Raghunath along with others threatened Babban Singh, an employee of the Titagarh Paper Mill, saying that the workers who would betray the cause of the strikers by resuming work and assisting the Management would meet with dire consequences. The third ground was that in the morning of September 14, 1954, Raghunath along with others threatened Jamadar Singh, an employee of the Titagarh Paper Mill, with assault and serious consequences. Raghunath Prosed showed cause in due course before the Advisory Board; and after obtaining opinion of the Advisory Board, Government made an order for detention of Raghunath for the period of one year. Accordingly, this application in the nature of Habeas Corpus has been filed by the Petitioner who is the wife of Raghunath Prosad.

(2.) THE first ground urged by Mr. Ajit K. Dutt in support of the petition is that the ground No. 1 mentioned in the order of the District Magistrate, dated September 14, 1954, is vague, indefinite and sweeping in nature and, therefore, it could not be a valid ground on which the District Magistrate could be satisfied that Raghunath was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that it was necessary, therefore, to keep him in'preventive detention. Mr. Dutt concedes that the first portion of the first ground, namely, that at a meeting held on September 11, 1954, between 17 -30 hours and 18 -30 hours at Matkal Maidan, Eaghunath in the course of his speech abused the Management in filthy language and threatened anybody who would resume work without the consent of the Union leaders, was precise enough; but he contended that the second part of the first ground was vague and that it was not clear whether Raghunath himself had shouted objectionable slogans, e.g., "Whoever would go to work in the mill would be killed," let us go to the mill and kill the Sahibs (European Officers)" and so on. Mr. Dutt had urged that the words used in these orders mean that the processionists shouted the slogans and Eaghunath was merely in the procession and that being so, that would be no ground for being satisfied that Raghunath was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. But having read the paragraph in question we are not satisfied that there is any vagueness in the sentence. The sentence actually reads as follows:

(3.) THE second point urged by Mr. Dutt is that the second and third grounds specified in the order of the District Magistrate, dated September 14, 1954, relate to intimidation of private individuals and do not relate to any action which might be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and that, therefore, they could not be considered as ground which might satisfy the District Magistrate that Raghunath Prosad, the Petitioner's husband, was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The grounds mentioned, however, do not merely show that two individuals Babban Singh and Jamadar Singh were privately intimidated. On the other hand, the language alleged to Raghunath Prosad would show that Raghunath was threatening the people in general and that Babban Singh and Jamadar Singh happened to be individuals to whom such general threats were also uttered. Raghunath is alleged to have said that the workers who would betray the cause of the strikers by resuming work and assisting the Management to run the factory with the workers recruited from outside, would meet with dire consequences, and Raghunath also threatened to set fire to the houses of such betrayers and kill them and their family members, and to create such a situation that the rest of the workers would be afraid of going against the Union in future. If such threats are uttered to a few individual loyal workers of the mill, it is clear that all the loyal workers would be terrorised and that there would he likelihood of disturbance of the public order. Accordingly, these two cases cannot be regarded as cases of intimidation of private individuals only with no flavour of disturbing the public order in them. We are satisfied that in the circumstances in which the threats were uttered to Babban Singh and Jamadar Singh there was sufficient reason to think that Raghunath was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.