(1.) THE universal application of the principle of law of regard to an opportunity of hearing to a party litigant does find an exception in the event of the party, who claims such a right is in contempt of the Court; but this exception is not an absolute exception or an absolute bar but is itself subject to certain exceptions. As early as 1909 Sir Asutosh mookherjee in Dharmapal v Monant Krista Dayal (10; Calcutta Law Journal 631) pointed out that the principle that a party in contempt cannot be board is neither inflexible nor of universal application and the court has a discretion in the matter. Sir Asutosh observed that because a party is found to be in contempt, the Court is not bound to deny him all assistance or protection but the court will act in such a manner as will maintain its own dignity and at their same time subserve the ends of justice. Sir George jesoel M. R. in Ree Clements and Costa Rica Republic v Enlarger (1877: Lj. ch. 375) stated the law to be; "applying this principle I of opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed the order of the Court is not of itself a bar to his being heard, but his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the trust or to enforce the order which it may make, then the court may in his discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason shown why it should not be removed. This principle of law as enunciated by Jessel MR. has also had its due recognition by the English courts in later decisions. Lord denning in Hadkinson v Hadkinson 1952) 2 All ER 567 observed that unless disobedience of a party impedes the course of justice in the case, making it difficult for the Court to ascertain the truth or to enforce its order, it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to refuse the part in contempt any hearing.
(2.) THE decision of this Court in the case of S. S. Roy v Damodar Valley corporation (78 CWN 144) also recorded that the general rule of denial of opportunity of hearing to a party in contempt, cannot be termed to be in any way an absolute proposition of law but only qualified one being subject to various exceptions.
(3.) THIS Court further in the case of Debabrata Mukherjee v Gouripur company Limited (1976 (2) C. L. J. 76) also expressed a view similar to above and observed that the Court is not bound to deny a party, who is found to be in contempt, all assistance or protection but the Court will act in a manner to subserve the ends of justice.