SUKUMAR DAS Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revisional application under Sec. 401 read with Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is for quashing the proceeding, being Singur P. S. Case No. 21 dated 30.12.1978 under Sec. 13(1) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 initiated against the petitioner on a report of the Sub-Inspector of Police District Enforcement Branch, Hooghly dated 18.12.1979 before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Chandernagore, alleging that the petitioner carried on a business of rice milling operation as owner of a daddy husking mill without licence in contravention of Sec. 8 of the said Act.

(2.) Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner hat challenged the aforesaid proceeding against the petitioner on the two-fold grounds Firstly, it is contended that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the alleged offence under Sec. 13(1) of the Act as no report in writing of the facts constituting such offence was made by the Licencing Officer or any person duly authorised by the Central Government or the Licensing Officer in this behalf as required under Sec. 15 of the Act. In this connection he has relied on the decision of Orissa High Court in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Bisram Patel, AIR 1965 Orissa 159 in which a learned Single Judge of the said High Court has expressed the view that Sec. 15 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act) specifically requires that the person making the report must be so authorised in respect of a particular offence in view of the phrase "in this behalf" in the section which is not without significance. Relying on the said decision, Mr. Banerjee contends that in the present case, the Sub-Inspector of Police who has made the report not having been authorised under Sec. 15 of the Act to do so in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is bad in law and not warranted by Sec. 15 of the Act. Upon consideration of the submissions made on this point on behalf of the petitioner and the State, I find that there is no substance in the point of law raised on behalf of the petitioner. In the aforesaid decision of the Orissa High Court the learned Judge has based his finding on a decision of the Orissa High Court reported in AIR 1963 Orissa 158 on an interpretation of Sec. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 which is in pari materia with Sec. 15 of the Act as it has been held in the said case of K.G. Anganawalu Vs. Chairman, Puri Municipality, AIR 1963 Orissa 158 that a criminal case fried against accused by a person who was not duly authorised in the manner required by Sec. 20(1) of the said Act was not maintainable in the absence of specific authorisation for a specific offence. In this connection reference may be made to the provisions of Sec. 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (as amended by Act 34 of 1976) which runs as follows:-

(3.) The expression "in this behalf" in Sec. 20(2) of the aforesaid Act has been considered in several decisions of different High Courts and it has been hold that a general authorisation of all Food inspectors is valid. In this connection reference my be made to the decisions reported in AIR 1966 Madras 194, AIR 1963 M;sore 157 and AIR 1969 Delhi 198. The view taken in AIR 1963 Orissa 158 has been dissented from it follows from those decisions that the word "authorised in this behalf" appearing in the second part, mean authorised to instituted or to give consent ta any prosecution for an offence under the Act, and that the words "in this behalf" do not mean that the authority must be given for each and every complaint. The general authority for taking actions sufficient. Authority can be conferred long before a particular offence takes place (See AIR 1970 SC 318) Similar interpretation should be given to the expression "in this behalf" in Sec. 15 of the Act. With all deference to the view expressed by the learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court in the decision relied on by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. I disagree and hold that the expression "in this behalf" in Sec. 15 of the Act does not require that there must be specific authorisation for each and every complaint or report under the said section So, the first ground taken on behalf of the petitioner for assailing the impugned proceeding fails.