PUNAM CHAND JAIN Vs. GENERAL ASSURANCE SOCIETY LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for filing of an arbitration agreement. It appears that there was a policy of Insurance dated the 7th April, 1972, covering loss caused by burglary and house-breaking. It is alleged that on the 19th March, 1973, a burglary took place and there was a loss to the goods in question covered by the Policy in this application. The defendant company on the 2nd May, 1973, repudiated the said claim. The said repudiation was reiterated by a letter dated the 14th July, 1973. On the 24th October, 1973, reference was made to arbitration under the clause. The said Policy contained, inter alia, the following:

(2.) THE first point is that the General Assurance Society Ltd. has merged with the National Insurance, Company Ltd. THErefore, the application is not maintainable. It appears to me that this is a formal objection in the facts of this case. THE National Insurance Co. Ltd. is really appearing before me and I accordingly direct that in place of the defendant No. 1 the name of National Insurance Co. Ltd, be substituted. THE respondent has no objection to the same. THE second point in opposition to this application was that the claim had become barred by limitation and as such the plaintiff had abandoned the claim and was not entitled to proceed with the arbitration. Reliance was placed on the aforesaid Arbitration Clause and it was contended that in view of the fact that there was repudiation on the 2nd May, 1973, or in any event on the 14th July, 1973, and the claim had been referred to arbitration on the 24th October, 1973, the claim was no longer alive. In support of this argument reliance was placed or a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Girdharilal Hanuman Bux v. Eagle Star and British Dominions Insurance Co. Ltd., ATR 1924 Cal 186. But the question here is not whether the claim has become time barred. THE question is whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide the question whether the claim has become time barred in the facts of this case. On this matter there is no limitation in the facts of this case of filing the application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act and the question whether after the matter goes before arbitration it would be held that the matter had become, time barred or had been abandoned is not at this stage to be decided. THE amplitude given to the arbitration in the Arbitration Clause in my opinion, is an answer to the contention raised on behalf of the respondent. Reliance may be placed in support of the above proposition on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wazir Chand Mahajan v. THE Union of India, and on the decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. Amritsar v. Peare Lal Kumar AIR 1951 Punj 440. It was, thirdly, contended that the State Bank of Bikaner, Jaipur has not been made a party as a plaintiff. I do not see any substance in this opposition in view of the terms of the Insurance Clause. Furthermore, the Slate Bank of Bikaner, Jaipur, has been made a party as a defendant in the suit. THE last contention was that the petitioner was not entitled to an order in terms of prayer (b) of the petition in view of the provisions of Subsection (4) of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. I am unable to accept this position. In the aforesaid view of the matter there will be an order in terms of prayer (a). THE petitioner has already nominated its arbitrator. I direct the defendant No. 1 to nominate its arbitrator within two months from date. In default the arbitration will proceed in accordance with the arbitration agreement. In default of such nomination within two months from date the petitioner will be at liberty to obtain further directions from this Court. Cost of this application will be cost in the arbitration proceeding.