HUKUMCHAND INSURANCE CO LTD Vs. SUBASHINI ROY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for certificate to enable the appellant petitioner to prefer an appeal against our judgment and Order D/- 10-7-70. We need not for brevity's sake over again decide (recite) facts of the case for these would appear from our judgment. The appeal was preferred by the present petitioner Hukumchand Insurance Co. Ltd. against an Award of compensation for a sum of Rs. 24,300/- in favour of the respondent Sm. Subahsini Roy who was the mother of the victim who died as a result of motor accident. The Tribunal found on evidence that the son of the respondent was injured and died as a result of rash and negligent driving of the car involved. In the appeal before us the correctness of this finding as also the quantum of compensation was challenged by the appellant petitioner. An objection was taken, however, on behalf of the respondent as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that it was not open to the appellant to dispute the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal on matters not covered by the defence which it was not entitled to take under the law as provided under Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We, however, mainly following the decision of the Supreme Court in B. I. G. Insurance Co. v. Itbar Singh, concluded that the appeal was not maintainable at the instance of the injured appellant against the decision of the Claims Tribunal on ground not allowed under the Act.

(2.) Now, the provisions of the Article 133 of the Constitution have undergone substantial changes. By the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1972 it provides:

(3.) All other provisions have been scraped out with the result that the question of valuation of the appeal under previous Clauses (a) and (b) or the question of fitness for appeal in the circumstances as were provided in Clause (c) of Sub-article (i) of Article 133 of the Constitution did not arise. It is however, contended by Mr. Bose on behalf of the petitioner that since this application for certificate was pending at a time when the amendment did not come into force, it would come within the exception Clause as provided under Section 3 of the Amendment Act and the petitioner would be entitled to the benefits of Clause (a) or (b), as the case may be, under Sub-article (i) of Article 133. It is said that since the value of the subject-matter of the appeal is not less than Rs. 20,000/- it is entitled to a grant of certificate as a matter of course. We fail to see how this is so. The material part of Section 3 relevant for out present purpose provides :