CHATURBHUJ SOHANLAL Vs. CLIVE MILLS CO LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal from an order refusing to set aside an award of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Upon the application of the respondents for arbitration of their disputes with the appellants, the Registrar of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry constituted an arbitral Court on or about the 9th April, 1947.

(2.) RULES V(2), VII and XIV of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry are as follows:

(3.) IN exercising its discretionary power under Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the Court should bear in mind the provisions of Rules of the tribunal of arbitratiqn of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and INdustry which are a part and parcell of the arbitration agreement. Rule VII provides expressly for the course to be followed in the covent of the arbitral Court allowing the time or the extended time to expire without making an award. The proper course under the Rules in such a case, is the appointment of another arbitral Court by the Registrar. The Rules having expressly provided for the machinery to be followed in the event of the expiry of the time, that machinery should normally be followed and normally the powers of the Court under Section 28 of the Arbitration. Act 1940 should not be invoked. But cases may still arise where the interests--of justice demand that the Court should extend the time under Section 28 though the time has already exphed. IN the instant case the appellants' representative appeared before the arbitrators after the expiry of their time to make the award without any protest, made his submissions with regard to the market rate and invited the arbitrators to make their award. Besides the appellants are solely responsible for the delay in the making of the award. The arbitral proceedings were held up on account of the slay order obtained by the appellants which was subsequently vacated. IN all these circumstances A.N. Ray, J. thought it fit to extend the time under Section 28 on the Arbitration Act, 1940. Before us the propriety of the order of the extension of time is not challenged. Mr. Tibriwalla's sole contention was that the order of A.N. Ray, J. is without jurisdiction. This contention must be rejected. Under Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 the Court may enlarge the time irrespective of the contract of the parties, and even where the arbitration agreement puts a limit as to the time, see Denton v. Strong, (1874) 9 QE 117; May v. Harcourt, (1884) 13 QBD 688; Knowles and Sons Ltd. v. Bolton Corporation, (1900) 2 KB 253. It is not an obstacle to the extension of times that in the interval the arbitrators had done something which at that Lime was a nullity (See (1868) 3 QB 404) or that the arbitration agreement providee for the course to be followed in the event of the arbitrators allowing the time to expire without making an award, e.g., for a reference of the disputes to the umpire in such an event. See Dhansukhlal C. Mehta v. Navnitlal Chunilal AIR 1934 Bom 398.