SUDHANSU KUMAR AICH Vs. KANGAL CHANDRA MAITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Rule is directed against the order of the learned Munsif deciding three issues in favour of the plaintiffs opposite parties in the suit pending before him being Title Suit No. 172 of 1959. Three points which the learned Munsif decided are (1) The valuation of the suit and court fees, (2) Jurisdiction of the court and (3) maintainability of the suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. They were respectively issues Nos. 5, 2 and 6 before him. On the point of valuation he came to the decision that the suit being a suit for declaration with consequential relief, the plaintiff was at liberty to put his own valuation in the plaint and did so rightly under section 7 (IV) (c) of the Court Fees Act. The defendant petitioners have not complained against this finding before me and have not urged any argument in respect thereof. Similarly, in issue No. 6 relating to the maintainability of the suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, the learned Munsif came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred by section 42 of the said Act. Having regard to the disputed facts of possession and having regard to the injunction granted by the civil court restraining the defendant-petitioners from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff opposite party, this finding also was not challenge before me and Mr. Janah, learned advocate for the petitioners did not advance any argument against this finding of the learned Munsif.

(2.) THE only point on which Mr. Janah made his submission is the point about jurisdiction which was issue No. 2 and which was found by the learned Munsif in favour of the plaintiffs. The point about jurisdiction is that the petitioners' claim that the suit is barred by section 21 (1) of the Land Reforms Act. This sub-section (1) of section 21 of the Land Reforms Act provides a bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It expressly states that save as provided in section 19 no order or other proceeding whatsoever under this chapter shall be questioned in any civil court and no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter mentioned in sections 17 and 18 of the Act. Mr. Janah submits that this suit is covered by the provision of section 18 of the Act and is, therefore, barred by section 21 of the Act. Briefly, his submission is that in this suit the plaintiffs ask for a declaration that the ex parte award passed in the Bhagchas Case Nos. 70 to 85 of 1959 was not binding upon the plaintiffs. I have examined the plaint in the suit. The plaint is an attack on the award or order of the Bhagchash Officer dated 28th February, 1959 on the jotedar's petition for termination of the Barga and produce. The allegation in the plaint and specially in paragraph 8 thereof is that this whole order or award of the Bhagchas Officer was obtained by the plaintiffs opposite parties by suppression of the notice and process in the Bhagchash ease and that the petitioners did not know about this proceeding.

(3.) THE petitioners' case is that the plaintiffs of this suit were not the real owners but were mere Benamdars and the real owner was opposite party No. 10. To my mind, such a dispute comes directly under section 18 (2) of the Land Reforms Act which provide that any question whether a person is a bargadar or not and to whom the share of the produce is deliverable shall be determined by the officer or authority mentioned in section 18 (1) The contention therefore, of the petitioners is clearly within the purview of section 18 (2) of the Act because it was a proceeding brought for tremination of the cultivation by the Bargadar and for division or delivery of produce within the meaning of section 18 (1 ). The order or the award of this case did determine that the petitioners were the bargadars of the plaintiff opposite parties. Therefore,, on the plain language of section 21 (I) of the Act that order or award would be a bar for the civil court to try that question again. This is really the substance of Mr. Janah's argument appearing for the petitioners. Mr. Janah for the petitioners develops his argument further in this way. His submission is that the opposite parties did not avail of the remedies provided by the statute and should, therefore, be debarred from agitating this question by means of a civil suit in a civil court. In support of this argument he relies on section 19 of the Land Reforms Act which provides for an appeal to the Munsif again any order made under section 17 or 18 except of course where such order is with the consent of the parties to the dispute.