JADUNATH DAS Vs. MRINAL KANTI SAHA AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is on behalf of the judgment-debtor against an order dismissing on appeal his objection to the execution of a decree for ejectment passed on the 12th of July, 1946. The judgment contained a provision for stay of execution of the decree till the life of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act X of 1940. On the 26th of November. 1949, the decree-holder filed the present petition for execution. Before the courts below, the judgment-debtor claimed protection from ejectment under section 7 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural. Tenancy Act, 1949. Both the courts below held that the judgment-debtor was not entitled to such protection. In, this Court Mr. Banerjee who has appeared in support of the appeal has not contested the above finding but has contended that the judgment-debtor is entitled to protection under section 9(1) (c) of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, inasmuch as the grounds referred to in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of section 9 do not apply in the present case. It is further contended that section 9 of the Act is attracted because of the provisions contained in section 88 of the said Act. Sec. 88 of the Act provides that the provisions of this Act (West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1919) shall have effect in respect of all suits, appeals or proceedings including proceedings in execution for ejectment of a nonagricultural tenant which are pending at the date of commencement of this Act. The Act came into force on the 11th of May, 1949. Hence all suits appeals or proceedings pending on that date would be governed by the Act. It is contended that in the present case the execution proceeding must be deemed to be pending, because of the prohibition contained in the decree for ejectment staying execution of the decree for the life of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940. In the present case, no prior execution was levied. The mere fact that the decree, for ejectment passed on the 12th of July, 1946, could not be executed during the above period does not connote that the execution of the decree was pending for the entire period during which the stay operated. What the Act contemplates is that the suits, appeals or proceedings referred to in section 88 must be actually pending at the date when the Act comes into, operation. In our opinion, it cannot be said that a proceeding for execution of the decree was pending one the 15th of May, 1949, when the Act came into operation. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention raised by Mr. Banerjee.

(2.) This appeal must accordingly fail and is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. Guha Ray, J. - I agree.