DWIJENDRA LALL BYSACK Vs. ANIL KUMAR HALDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against an appellate decree of the Subordinate Judge, first court, Howrah, reversing that of the munsif, local second court. The tenant Defendant is the Appellant.

(2.) It appears that the proper effect and meaning of that decision have perhaps been misunderstood by the Bar, as I find from the arguments in this case. I pointed out that the primary consideration is not the consideration of pecimiary gain to the landlord, but the primary consideration for the decision of the court must be the gain to public accommodation, that is, whether it will increase public accommodation or not i.e., extend it to such reasonable extent as will justify throwing out a tenant in a congested accommodation market. This has been taken to mean that the question of economic gain must not be considered at all. As has been pointed out in a reported decision of P.B. Mukharji, J., in the case of Basant Lal Saha v. P.C. Chakravarty,1949 84 CalLJ 108. "reasonable" includes bona fides and in determining bona fides of a landlord's requirement, the questions whether it will cause economic gain and whether the landlord has got the means to build and whether he has or is taking proper steps to build are questions which the court may consider. I agree with it. In addition to this the further consideration for the court will be whether even if the landlord satisfies the test of bona fides, it will lead to greater public advantage of increased accommodation.

(3.) The second misunderstanding of the judgment appears to be that the personal disadvantage of a particular tenant must also be weighed. The tenant as an individual person, in a case of building and re-building, is not the subject-matter of consideration by the statute in connection with reasonable requirement; but the tenant in the premises is also a member of the public. Therefore, if by building or re-building, the advantage of increased public accommodation is so slight that it is not at all commensurate with the disadvantage to another member of the public by throwing him on a congested market, then it cannot be said to be reasonable requirement as laid down in the statute. It was not meant by that decision that if there was going to be increased accommodation to the public, the court should prevent such extension of accommodation on the ground of disadvantage to a private individual tenant. The disadvantage to the tenant on being ejected must be considered not on his individual personal ground but as a member of the public and in comparison with expected public advantage.