(1.) This appeal is by Defendant No. 2 and it arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession.
(2.) The suit property originally belonged to the husband of Defendant No. 1. On the death of the original owner, his widow, Defendant No. 1, inherited the suit property. Thereafter, according to the Plaintiff, she executed a kabala for legal necessity in respect of this property in her favour on June 6, 1943. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant No. 1 duly received the consideration and then the document was presented for, registration on September 23, 1943 and it was duly registered according to law. The Defendant No. 2 claims the suit property under a kabala, executed by Defendant No. 1 in her favour on August 7, 1943 and registered on August 14, 1943. The Defendant No. 2's case is that the Plaintiff's kabala was ante-dated and, further, that it was not executed by Defendant No. 1 and never registered by her but that the execution and registration was obtained by the Plaintiff through some false impersonation. Defendant No. 1, though duly summoned, did not appear in the suit. Both the courts below have rejected the defence case and decreed the suit in the Plaintiff's favour. Hence this second appeal by the contesting Defendant No. 2.
(3.) It has been found by both the courts below that the allegations of Defendant No. 2 that the Plaintiff's kabala was ante-dated and that its execution and registration was obtained through false impersonation of Defendant No. 1 are not true. That finding, on the state of the materials on record, cannot be challenged in second appeal and must be accepted by me. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, who appears on behalf of the Appellant (Defendant No. 2) however, argues that, on the admitted facts about registration, no title passed to the Plaintiff on the basis of the kabala in her favour. He points out that, in that kabala, the record (endorsement) of admission of execution by the sub-registrar was not endorsed by the Defendant No. 1 as required by Section 58 of the Indian Registration Act. He further points out that it is the admitted case of the parties that the receipt under Section 52 of the said Act was not endorsed over to the Plaintiff. From these facts, Mr. Roy Chowdhury argues that the registration of the document was invalid and that, in any event, it did not pass any title to the Plaintiff as the necessary intention to pass title was wanting. I am finable to accept either of these two contentions of Mr. Roy Chowdhury.