SISIR KUMAR LAHA Vs. J N MAJUMDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is an employee of the opposite party No. 17, The Bank of India Limited. What had happened is this: The Bank had certain disputes with its workmen and the result was that certain workmen, namely, the opposite parties Nos. 4 to 15 and one Ram Bhadra Misra were dismissed from service on or about 27-12-1951. These 13 dismissed employees objected to their dismissal and on 22-7-1952 an order was made referring the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta constituted under Section 7, Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The dispute was as follows: "Whether the termination of the services of the undermentioned persons from the Calcutta Branch of the Bank was justified and, if not, what relief should be granted to them." Then follows the names of the 13 dismissed employees. It appears that the petitioner here was taken in to fill the vacancy caused by the dismissal of these workmen. He was taken in, on or about 2-1-1952. It is clear therefore that when the dispute which was subsequently referred to for adjudication arose, the petitioner was not employed by the Bank at all. He came in afterwards. He is not one of the persons whose services were ever terminated and his name is not in the schedule annexed to the order dated 22-7-1952. With regard to the dispute which was referred to adjudication, the Tribunal made an award on or about 9-3-1953. It did not allow reinstatement - but directed that compensation should be paid at the rate of 6 months' basic salary plus allowances, except to the opposite party No. 11 who was to get three months' basic salary plus allowances. It appears that opposite parties Nos. 4 to 16 filed an appeal against the said award before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the appeal being registered as "Calcutta 32 pf 1953." On 15-9-1953, the appeal was allowed and the Labour Appellate Tribunal directed that the opposite parties Nos. 4 to 15 were to be re-instated. The petitioner was not made a party either to the dispute which was referred to adjudication, nor was he made a party to the appeal.

(2.) In the present application what is said is that the petitioner should have been made a party to the appeal and that a writ in the nature of certiorari should be issued quashing the order dated 15-9-1953, and all proceedings relating thereto. The petitioner has also prayed for a writ in the nature of Prohibition prohibiting. the respondents from giving effect to the said decision and also a Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the opposite parties Nos. 1 to. 3 to cancel or vacate the said decision.

(3.) In my opinion, this is a misconceived application. The petitioner is not a party to the trade dispute which has been referred. The dispute which has been referred relates to the dismissal of 13 employees in order to find out as to whether their dismissal was justified and, if not, what was to be done about it. At the time the dispute arose, the petitioner was not in the service of the Bank at all. How therefore he. could be made a party in the proceeding before the Tribunal which adjudicated the dispute or before the Appellate Tribunal which considered the appeal, I cannot see. Mr. Sanyal appearing on behalf of the petitioner next says that the order of reference decides that there existed an industrial dispute between the Bank and its workmen. He therefore argues that the dispute was a collective dispute and must be taken to be a dispute between the Bank and all its workmen including the petitioner. He says that if the reinstatement order of the Appellate Tribunal is given effect to, the petitioner will be affected and therefore he should have been made a party to the appeal. Firstly, I am unable to agree with this argument in so far as it seeks to characterise the industrial dispute referred to as one between the Bank and all its workmen. The order of reference clearly states that it was a dispute between the Bank and its workmen in respect of the matter specified in the schedule thereto annexed. The schedule clear- ly shows that the dispute was with regard to the termination of services of 13 specified employees. Mr, Sanyal next argues that an industrial dispute cannot arise between an individual workman and the employer. He says that unless all the workmen raise the dispute, it cannot be called an industrial dispute. He concedes that if an union of workers took up the cause of an individual worker, it might develop into an industrial dispute but until that is done a dispute raised by an individual workman cannot be called an industrial dispute and therefore the proceedings in respect thereof under the Industrial Disputes Act are wholly without jurisdiction. Whether a dispute between an employer and an individual workman can be called an industrial dispute is a matter of some difficulty. My attention has been drawn to several decisions to which I shall now refer.