HEMANGINI DEBI Vs. SUKUMAR BASU AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against an appellate decree passed by the Sub-Judge, 6th Court, Alipore, affirming that of the Munsif, 1st Additional Court at Alipore.

(2.) The plaintiff sued in ejectment. The only question in the present case is whether the plaintiff has succeeded in removing the bar to ejectment under Rent Control Act. Three reasons were given by the plaintiff why the protection of the Rent Control Act should not be given to the tenant. The first is default in payment of rent for more than 6 months within a period of 18 months. Here it appears that the tenant had gone to the Rent Controller for fixation of rent. The original rent was Rs. 100 and the Rent Controller fixed the rent with effect from 1.7.49 at Rs. 55 per month and he directed that for the overpayment made since that day up to the date of his order, which was 25.10.49, a deduction of Rs. 25 per month may be made out of the subsequent current rents payable. In accordance with it, for the rents for the months of Oct., 1949, to Feb., 1950, payment was made at the rate of Rs 30 per month and Rs. 45 was paid for March, 1950. The Appeal Court allowed an increment of rent and fixed the standard rent at Rs. 60 per month and this amount of Rs. 60 would be payable in lieu of the contractual rent with effect from 1-8-49 and made no order for adjustment monthly. There is therefore no doubt that when calculations were made and adjustments given for the overpayment which was made to the landlord the default was only for 4 months and not for the statutory period, of 6 months. Therefore the bar was not removed in view of section 14(3) of the Rent Control Act.

(3.) The next reason given by the landlady was that she reasonably required the premises for her own use and occupation. As the matter has got to go back, it is undesirable for this Court to express any opinion on that question. The learned Sub-Judge has dealt with the matter in a manner which one does not expect from an experienced Sub-Judge. Reasonable requirement has to be decided on the existing accommodation. The learned Sub-Judge has pointed out how by further construction the landlady can meet her reasonable requirement for extra accommodation, but unfortunately for the landlady the learned Sub-Judge did not offer to finance the landlady out of his own salary for the purpose. It is futile to give such gratuitous advice. It is desirable that the Court should decide upon existing materials. This reason given by the learned Sub-Judge must be excluded from consideration in a decision on this point.