ANJALI DEVI CHAUDHRY Vs. FIRST LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application challenging the acquisition of premises No.68, Golf Club Road, (now known as, Uday Shankar Sarani), which was sought to be acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted as follows. The petitioner was the owner of 68, Uday Shankar Sarani. The petitioner got the ownership of the said land by way of purchase. The property had area of 6 cottahs 15 chittacks and 43 sq.ft. (468.05 sq. meters). The premises No.70 Uday Shankar Sarani, was just contiguous to premises No.68, Uday Shankar Sarani. Smt. Kamala Banerjee was the owner of 70, Uday Shankar Sarani, having an area 32 sq. meters. The balance 436.10 sq. meter of 70, Uday Shankar Sarani, Kolkata stood vested to the State and after vesting the said area of 436.10 sq. meter was settled in favour of Shrutinandan, the respondent No.3. Shrutinandan was a society registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. Pandit Ajoy Chakraborty, the respondent No.4, used to run the said society alongwith its other members.

(3.) Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 submitted as follows. The proceedings under the Land Acquisitions Act, 1894 were done properly. The decisions taken under Sec. 5A of the said Act if not communicated to the Petitioner would not render the proceedings invalid. There was acquiescence of the petitioners to the proceedings, which rendered the present petition infructuous. There was a difference between public purpose and public utility. The contention of the petitioner that they were not served with a copy of the orders of the proceedings u/s 5-A was not valid simply because the statute did not require the respondent to do the same. The aforesaid Sec. did not provide for any order, but merely a report that had to be filed by the Collector after hearing the objections. Reliance was placed on Ramniklal N. Bhutta and Anr. Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors., (1997) 1 SCC 134. Courts should keep the larger public interest in mind when deciding the writ petitions. There were multiple ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong. The petitioners herein submitted to the process of acquisition and of further proceedings after the declaration was made under Sec. 6 of the Act. The petitioner by their conduct acquiesced to the proceedings and therefore could not challenge the same by a writ petition. Shrutinandan fell under the definition of 'public purpose' given under Sec. 3(f)(vi), as it was an educational scheme, sponsored by the Government, by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, not as a company as contended by the petitioners. The phrase 'public purpose' could not be given a narrow meaning as had been done by the petitioners in this case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the landmark decision in State of Bihar vs. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshivar Singh of Darbhanga, (1952) 1 SCC 528, held that anything that furthered the general interests of the community as opposed to a particular interest of an individual must be regarded as public purpose. In another decision it was held that 'Public purpose was bound to vary with times and prevailing conditions in the Community or locality and, therefore, the legislature had left it to the State (Government) to decide what public purpose was and also to declare the need of a given land for the purpose. The legislature had left the discretion to the Government regarding public purpose. The Government had the sole and absolute discretion in the matter.' The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pratibha Nema v State of M.P. and Ors., (2003) 10 SCC 624, held that the for an acquisition for facilitating the setting up of an industry in private sector could get imbued with the character of public purpose acquisition if only the Government came forward with the sanction of the payment of nominal sum towards compensation. The same was done by the State Government in the instant case. In addition to the above, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that whether an acquisition was for 'public purpose' or not, the Government was the best judge. There was no scope for any individual interest or the interest of one person in this present case. Further, the three conditions (the standards) that were to be considered when land was being acquired for the public purpose were - a) The number of people affected as against the number of people benefitted. b) The extent to which the affected people would be affected and the benefitting people would be benefitted. This would encompass the cumulative effect of the acquisition. c) The effect (the benefit to general public from opening the school) and the cost of mitigation (the compensation to be paid in this case) would have to be considered so that the costs of mitigation did not exceed the effect. The Court could not question the decisions taken by the legislature unless it violated:-i) Due process of law, ii) Exceeded the limits of the statutory procedure as laid down by the legislature, iii) Infringed fundamental rights, iv) Invalidated/infringed any other law for the time being in force. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of TISCO v Union of India, (1996) 9 SCC 709, held that the Court would not interfere with decisions taken by the Government unless the decision was inconsistent with constitutional principles and laws in force. In Rajeev Suri v DDA, (2022) 11 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a pure policy decision of the Government could not be challenged unless there was a 'manifest illegality or arbitrariness or procedural lapses in the culmination of a policy decision'. It was also held that while disclosure of information in public domain depicted transparency, absence of such information would not vitiate the administrative process. The effect of such absence of information had to be tested on the anvil of actual prejudice to the citizen's ability to participate in decision making process. It has to result in denial of a legally enforceable right. In the present case, the State Government followed the procedure laid down by the legislature there was compliance with the procedure laid down by law. The petitioners had not made any averment to show that the executive in exercise of its functions failed to follow the statutory provisions. No legally enforceable right of the petitioner had been violated in this case. With respect to disclosure of decisions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kalumiya Karimmiya v The State of Gujarat and Ors., (1977) 1 SCC 715, held that the non-supply of collector's report on the non-conclusion of the hearing, where no mala fides were alleged, held, was not fatal since another hearing by the State Government under Sec. 6 was not required under the law.