GLACIER COMMERCE PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. UDAY NATH BEHERA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only ground urged in assailing the order impugned is that the trial Court was apparently oblivious to section 44 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 that exclusively parks certain matters pertaining to tenancies with the Rent Controller and expressly prohibits civil courts from entertaining "any suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to fixation of fair rent in relation to any premises to which this Act applies or to any other matter which the Controller is empowered by or under this Act to decide..." The opposite parties have filed a suit seeking a declaration as to tenancy and in such suit have applied for repair of the suit premises. The petitioners herein claim that since essential repairs to any tenanted premises are covered by section 35 of the said Act of 1997, the application made by the opposite parties has, therefore, to be regarded as a matter which the Controller is empowered under the said Act to decide on; and, as a consequence, the civil court would not have the authority to entertain such application.

(2.) It is now beyond question that where a suit for eviction is pending and eviction is sought on any of the grounds under section 6 of the said Act of 1997, it is open to the defending tenant to seek either leave of the trial Court or a direction from the trial Court on the landlord for repairing the tenanted premises and the like. Matters covered under section 35 of the said Act of 1997, notwithstanding section 44 of the said Act, are, thus, capable of being carried before a civil court; and the bar under section 44 has to be read down in case of matters where the civil court is already in seisin of an action pertaining to the tenanted premises.

(3.) There is very good reason for the exception to section 44 being carved out. While it is accepted that independent proceedings in respect of matters which the Controller is empowered to decide on under the said Act of 1997 cannot be carried before a civil court, section 44 of the said Act of 1997 cannot preclude an interlocutory application pertaining to matters that apparently fall within the exclusive domain of the Controller under the said Act of 1997 to be made before the civil court in seisin of a larger action. The exception is supported by the legal principle that when an action is already pending before a judicial forum - and such judicial forum is a civil court, no less - all matters pertaining to the property in question should be confined to the forum and not carried elsewhere. It is a matter of public policy and the exception carved out promotes the larger principle of avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings.