KANU BHAKTA Vs. STATE BANK OF BIKANER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The writ petitioner is aggrieved by the initiation of a disciplinary proceeding against him. It was initiated by the charge-sheet dated Oct. 1st, 2002. The two grounds of challenge are:- (i) There was no reason to initiate it, once he was acquitted by the competent criminal Court. (ii) It was initiated after inordinate unexplained delay.

(2.) In 1968 the petitioner joined the respondent-bank (State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur). He was working as cash peon in its Salkia Branch. On Nov. 12th, 1981 he absented himself from duties without obtaining any leave. On the same day a dacoity took place in the bank at around 13.55 hours. A sum of Rs. 12,11,225.00 was taken away by the dacoits from the strong room and counter of the bank. On Nov. 13th, 1981 at around 2.20 a.m. police recovered a sum of Rs. 1,19,485.00 from his residence. Along with his wife he was arrested and sent for trial under Sec. 395, Sec. 397 and Sec. 412 of the Indian Penal Code. By judgment and order dated July 31st, 1985 while his wife was convicted under Sec. 395 and sentenced to 3 years R.I., he was acquitted. Out of eight accused persons three (including his wife) were convicted and sentenced. Challenging the judgment and order the state preferred an appeal and the bank filed a revision. In such circumstances the proceeding was initiated. He submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on Oct. 16th, 2002 and raised the plea of delay. During progress of the enquiry lie took out this writ petition dated Feb. 14th, 2003. By order dated Feb. 25th, 2003 it was admitted, and further proceedings of the enquiry was stayed.

(3.) The first ground of challenge has been urged by the counsel for the petitioner on the strength of the decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., (1999)3 SCC 679. Since his contention is only regarding sufficiency of reasons in the present case, I think, I cannot read the authority for any benefit of the petitioner. Existence or absence of reasons, which I am asked to examine, is bound to emerge only from the facts of the present case, and the peculiar circumstances of the decision cited, they were described as such by their Lordships for not granting liberty to re-open the previous ex-parte enquiry, will not be any authority for the purpose. Here, the facts and circumstances, which I shall point out presently while dealing with the second ground, do not leave me in any doubt about the existence of sufficient reasons to initiate the proceeding against the petitioner even after his acquittal at the trial Court stage of the criminal case.