(1.) Education with which we are concerned here is the subject-matter of Directive Principles of the State Policy contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution. It is the obligation of the State to create appropriate environment for imparting appropriate education to its future citizens. Largely education in this State depends on the aid made available by the State to the institutions imparting education. Even the appellant institution gets such aid. The members of the present Managing Committee of the appellant had no contribution in establishing the institution. They became members of the Managing Committee of the appellant in view of Rule 6 of the 1969 Management Rules which has directed constitution of a Managing Committee by the members representing the guardians, members representing the teaching and non-teaching staff and members to be nominated by the State and its officers. The Managing Committee of the appellant school is receiving aid from the State to the extent of dearness allowance payable to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school. The quantum of such aid is equivalent to quantum of dearness allowance payable to the teaching and non teaching staff of fully aided institutions. The difference between the partially aided institution and fully aided institution is that whereas partially aided institution gets only the portion of the dearness allowance whereas the fully aided institution gets dearness allowance as well as the basic salaries by way of aid from the Government. While the portion of the aid received by the school towards dearness allowance is being paid to the teaching and non-teaching staff, the school has not bothered to pay the minimum basic salary prescribed by the Government for fully aided as well as the other school including the Anglo-Indian Schools. The Managing Committee of the school is contending that it is unable to pay the same. The learned Single Judge has observed in the impugned judgment and order that in the event the Managing Committee is unable to pay the same, they should close the institution. The question is whether this observation of the learned Single Judge in the perspective is appropriate or inappropriate. In matters which are governed by Directive Principles of State Policy, the principal consideration of the Court would be not the benefit which a particular person is entitled to get in the matter of implementation of a policy pertaining to such Directive Principles. What the Court is required to see is for whose benefit the policy has been made. The policy relating to recognition of an institution, settling of a curriculum, prescribing the qualifications of teachers, prescribing the standard of education to be imparted and laying down the basic infrastructure by way of policy are all aimed at imparting education to that child who would ultimately become a full-fledged responsible citizen of this country. It has to be seen what he gets. It is not necessary to see what others get for implementation of this policy. A person, who is agreeable to impart education at a price less than the minimum prescribed price, may not be a person competent to impart such education. A future citizen who, by reason of the circumstances, has been compelled to take education from him will thus suffer. In that background the Government has come out with the policy that the minimum what is being paid to a teacher to teach in other institution, at least that must be paid. The Managing Committee of the appellant is not agreeable to discharge even that of obligation on the ground of financial constraint. We feel that when others are capable of doing what Government is seeking the appellant to do, failure on the part of the Managing Committee of the institution show that the members of the Managing Committee have proved themselves to be incapable. They have no interest otherwise in the institution. If they have failed, they should have resigned from the school management so that other competent people can take charge of the Managing Committee of the institution and to give them an opportunity to find the ways and means to improve the financial position of the school.
(2.) We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the judgment and order impugned in this appeal and, accordingly, we dismiss the application for stay and the appeal treating the same as on days' list with the consent of the parties is dismissed.
(3.) There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal and application dismissed.