STATE OF WEST BENGAL Vs. GOLAM ALI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) All these four appeals are taken up simultaneously since these involve similar question of fact and law.

(2.) Assailing the judgment and decree passed in L.R.A. Case Nos. 215 to 218 of 1993(V) passed by the learned Additional Special L.A. Judge, 1st Court, 24 Parganas (South) on 11th of April, 1994, Mr. Basu argued that the valuation was disproportionately enhanced relying on an inadmissible document. The document (Ext. 1) on which reliance was placed was not proved. According to him, section 51A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1894 Act) though permits reception of evidence without examination of the vendor and the vendee of the document yet it does not permit the Court to treat such evidence as sacrosanct. The Court has to weigh the evidence in order to arrive at a conclusion, which the Court did not do. According to him, the Court did not apply its mind and had simply followed the earlier judgment, which did neither operate as res judicata nor as a precedent. Mr. Basu further contended that there was no provision for grant of recurring compensation and referred to section 7(3)(4) and section 8 of the West Bengal Land Requisition and Acquisition Act, 1948 (1948 Act) to contend that the recurring compensation was not payable. Mr. Basu had relied on various decisions to support his contention, as advanced by him. He also contended that no basic norm was indicated as to how the valuation of the Danga and Doba land were assessed. Therefore, the judgment is liable to be set aside.

(3.) Mr. Bera for the respondents contended that the Ext. 1 was accepted by the appellant and that the same was also tendered by the appellant, being Ext. A, in the proceedings and submitted before the Court that the same should be treated as the yardstick for determining the compensation. Therefore, all these submissions which Mr. Basu had made were ineffective and without any basis. On the other hand, he contended that though the claimants did not prefer any cross appeal or cross objection yet under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), they could claim the benefit which was otherwise payable in law to them and which had since been denied in infraction of the provisions of law, viz. the component payable under section 23(1A) of the 1894 Act was not included in the compensation. He relied on the decision in Tulsi Charan Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, (2003)2 CLT 556 (HC) and pointed out that such amount payable under section 23(1A) of the 1894 Act was also payable in respect of acquisition under the 1948 Act. However, in his usual fairness he conceded that it was payable only with effect from 1st April 1994 and not prior thereto, as was held in Tulsi Charan Mukherjee (supra). In this case, the award was passed before the date when the amendment incorporated became effective and as such, this principle might not apply in this case. We appreciate the fairness of Mr. Bera in pointing out the case against himself. He again relied upon the decision in State of West Bengal v. Molla Amanulla, (2003)1 CLT 346 (HC), where it was held that unless cross appeal or cross objection was filed, the claimant was not entitled to raise any claim and contended that this ratio seemed to be in conflict with the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 33 Code of Civil Procedure and the ratio decided in the decisions of the Supreme Court.