(1.) Both the cases have been heard together and are being disposed of by our common judgment. the two petitioners is the two cases noted above have been detained under the orders of detention under section 3 (1) of the COFBPOSA Act the allegation in each of the orders is that such detention was necessary with a view to preventing She petitioners from dealing in smuggled good.
(2.) The orders of detention have been challenged before us on three grounds. Firstly, that the articles in question, being Floppy Discs, are freely importable and as such could not be smugged goods ; secondly, that certain confessional statements were relied on by the Authorises in making the order of detention without any advertence to the fact that three were refracted and as such there was non-application of mind; thirdly, that there was long and unexplained delay in between the occurrence of the alleged prejudicial activities and the serving of ti e orders of detention. In our view, the two cases can be disposed of on the third ground alone, i.e., the ground of delay and, therefore, the other two grounds need not detain us.
(3.) From the grounds of detention served on the two petitioners it appears that the detention is squarely based on the alleged confessional statements made by the petitioners and their alleged associate recorded on 3.6.92, while the orders of detention have been served on the petitioners on 4.11.92. There has been no satisfactory explanation of this delay, while the law appears to be that unexplained delay of considerable period is fatal to the order of detention. It is not alleged, nor there is anything on record to show, that there has been any fresh or further activity on behalf of the petitioners after those statements were recorded. Under the circumstances the essential chain of connection between to alleged prejudicial activities and the orders of detention is snapped to vitiate the alleged subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authorities. Reference, for example, may be made, among others, to the decisions of the Supreme Court (1) Rabindra Kumar Ghosal (AIR 1975 SC 1408), in (2) lagan Nath Biswas (AIR 1975 SC 1516) and in (3) Md. Sahabuddin (AIR 1973 SC 1722). Even according to the decision of the Supreme Court in (4) Rajendra Kumar Natavarlal (AIR 1988 SC 575), on which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the Defacing Authorities, though mere delay, by itself, may not be fatal, it would be fatal if the grounds have become stale. We are inclined to think that if the detention is based on those confessional statements and there were recorded an early as on 3.6 92, the grounds have obviously become stale and belated on 4.11.92 when the orders of detention were served on the petitioners.