PEERLESS DRIVE UNITED Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WITH the changing structure of society, the Law Courts in its bid and relevant to the context of time, have also kept pane so as to do complete justice between the parties. Since the days of Radha Krishna Agarwal in 1977 (AIR 1977 SC 1496) the Supreme court has been seriously considering the expansion of the horizon in administrative law with particular reference to the concept of fairness in a governmental action culminating into however, the decision in Shrilekha Vidyarthi. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court has not been ousted as such, but the purview of writ jurisdiction has undoubtedly been widened. In srilekha Vidyarthi (AIR 1991 SC 537) the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms suggested that contractual matters even, can come up for consideration before the Writ Court since all governmental agencies are supposed to act fairly and reasonably and in the event, there being any departure, the Writ Court ought not to hesitate to entertain the issue irrespective of the fact that the matter pertains to the contractual field. The introduction of the concept of promissory estoppel was undoubtedly a welcome advancement in this regard also, so far as the Writ jurisdiction is concerned. The decision of this Court in Surendra Prasad Mishra vs. O. N. G. C. (AIR 1987 CAL 1) express laid down that the doctrine of promissory estoppel ought not to be restrictive in nature and thus be made applicable only in the matter of discharge of statutory functions but it ought to have its necessary extension to all fields including a contractual field. The subsequent decision of this Court in Steel Crackers vs. The State (1991 (1) CLJ 491) lends support to the view that the Writ Court is within its jurisdiction to interfere or intervene where occasion so arises in regard to matters which cannot but be termed to be contractual in nature.

(2.) THE Supreme Court subsequently, however, has in Kamdhenu Cattle feed Industries [jt 1992 (6) SC 259] applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation in administrative action vis-a-vis the jurisdiction of the Writ court. This is however, inspite of the factum of a different note being sounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Jalgaon Municipality. Whereas Pathak, J. in Somprokash Rekhi's case (AIR 1981 SC 212) has left it to be decided at a future point of time by reason of involvement of a wider debate in regard to the public law element in the contractual field. Venkatachaliah J. in Jalgaon Municipality stated it to be a relevant consideration in regard to the involvement of a public law element before any judicial review is called by the Writ Court. Be that as it may, in kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries (supra) Verma J. applied the doctrine of legitimate expectation in administrative action being the basis of a cause of action in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(3.) IT is therefore, no longer in the realm of consideration but a well settled principle of law, so far as the doctrine of legitimate expectation is concerned. Verma, J, in Paragraph 8 of the Report very succintly laid down that failure to consider and give due weight to the legitimate expectation of a citizen may render the decision arbitrary and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Verma, J. observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system to the extent indicated.