(1.) The instant Revisional Application by the petitioner 1st party is directed against the orders dated 14.6.93 and 22.6.93 passed by an Executive Magistrate, Midnapore Sadar North, in Case No. 147-N of 1993 before him. The said case arose out of an application filed by the petitioner under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Code). Even though that was an application filed by the petitioner-1st party (hereinafter referred lo as petitioner) for an order of restraint against the respondent-2 party (hereinafter referred to as respondent). The learned Executive Magistrate concerned by his impugned order dated 14.6.93, upon perusal of the Police Report dated 4.6.93, had rejected the petitioner's application, and had further directed the local police to see that the respondent can run the business in question smoothly without any interference from the petitioner whatsoever, though not so prayed for by her (2nd party). On an application filed by the petitioner for recalling the aforesaid order dated 14.6.93, the learned Magistrate by his subsequent impugned order dated 22.6.93 had declined to recall his aforesaid order dated 14.6.93 for the reasons recorded therein. The earlier order dated 14.6.93 stood as such. But since 60 days have already elapsed for the date of the aforesaid impugned order dated 14.6.93 the said order has clearly lost its force in view of the relevant provisions of the Code. The instant revisional application has accordingly been rendered infructuous. So also conceded by the learned Advocates for both the contesting parties during the hearing. The revisional Application is accordingly liable to be disposed of as having been rendered infructuous, in the aforesaid circumstances.
(2.) Before party with the matter would however, like to record my strongest disapproval about the manner in which the learned Executive Magistrate concerned appears to have deal: with the relevant case before him. As already indicated, on an application filed by the petitioner under section 144 of the Code for an order of restrain against the respondent for the reasons stated therein, the learned Magistrate concerned while rejecting the same by his impugned order dated 14.6.93 had directed the local police to see that the respondent (2nd party) can run the business in question smoothly without any interference whatsoever from the 1st party, though not so prayed for by her (2nd party). It also appears from the record that in a Civil Suit between the same parties in respect of the same very subject matter, the 1st Court of the Assistant District Judge at Midnapore in other Suit No. 142 of 1993 had passed an interim order of temporary injunction on 14.5.93 restraining the defendant therein, the 2nd party-respondent .before us, from making any disturbance in the peaceful running of the business in question by the plaintiff (the petitioner 1st party before us) til the disposal of the relevant application for temporary injunction in terms thereof, for the reasons recorded therein. The said order of the Civil Court dated 14.5.93 appears to be very much in force as there is rot the merest and faintest whisper by any of the parties that the same has since been vacated. I wonder how the learned Magistrate could even thereafter have allowed his impugned order dated 14.6.93 directing the local police to see that the 2nd party (respondent herein) can run the business in question smoothly without any interference whatsoever from the 1st party (petitioner herein), to continue, contrary to the aforesaid order dated 14.5.1993 passed by a competent Civil Court in the aforesaid relevant suit which is very much in force, even though the same had been brought to his notice by petition by the petitioner, herein which was rejected by him by his subsequent impugned order dated 22.6.93, betraying his total lack of knowledge of the basic and fundamental principles of law. The learned Magistrate concerned should have noted that the order of the competent Civil Court should prevail, in the aforesaid circumstances, and it would have been his duty to ensure compliance therewith by the parties concerned, instead of passing a contrary order on an application under section 144 of the Code, resulting in judicial chaos, in the manner he did.
(3.) However that may be, since the instant Revisional Application has been rendered insfructuous for the reasons stated above, no further order on it is called for. The Revisional Application be accordingly disposed of with the observations hereinabove made.