RAJKUMARI DUTTA Vs. ASHALATA DEBI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant before us is the owner of the disputed premises. The suit in question IB a suit for ejectment. It was brought toy the appellant against the heirs of the deceased original tenant Bhupendra Nath Das, those heirs being defendants Nos. 1-5 of the suit, and an alleged subtenant (defendant No. 8) and the present respondent No. 7, who also was stated to be a sub-tenant in occupation. The suit premises is numbered in the municipal register as premises No. 11 A, Haralal Mitra Street. The plaintiff claims to have purchased the suit premises on July 19, 1957, for her own occupation. At that time, one Bhupendra Nath Das, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants Nos. 1-5 (respondents Nos. 1-5), was in occupation as a tenant. He duly attorned to the plaintiff. The rental, payable for this tenancy, was Rs. 75/- per month and the said tenancy ran according to the English calendar month. On February 20, 1959, a notice was served on the tenants, defendants Nos. 1-5, which notice was to expire with the end of March, 1959. In the notice, the ground of ejectment was stated to be requisite defaults in payment of rent, as required under sec. 13 (1) (i) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and also reasonable requirement of the disputed premises by the plaintiff for her own occupation on account of the decree for ejectment, passed against her husband in respect of the premises, where the plaintiff with her husband and their family was residing at the time.

(2.) THE suit was initially contested by defendants Nos. 1-5 and defendant No. 7. The validity of the notice under sec. 13 (6) was specifically challenged but the notice, as it appears in this case, is a good and valid notice under the said section. It is expressly a notice of suit, as it is stated therein that, in case of the tenant's non-compliance with the said notice, a suit for recovery of possession will be filed by the plaintiff. In the notice, the ground of ejectment is also specifically stated and there can be no doubt also that it is more than a month's notice, as required under the foresaid section. This notice, there fore, satisfies all the requirements of law under the aforesaid statutory provision and its validity and sufficiency cannot be questioned. The point, then, is whether the plaintiff has been able to make out a case of reasonable requirement or a case of requisite defaults in payment of rent on the part of the tenant or tenants concerned to entitle her to a decree in the instant case.

(3.) ON the question of default, the position appears to be somewhat unsatisfactory, so far as the learned trial Judge's judgment is concerned. He did not go into this question as the tenants defendants (defendants Nos. 1-5), in the course of the suit, filed, on January 18, 1960, a compromise petition, wherein the plaintiff also joined and, under the terms of the said petition, the said defendants agreed to vacate the disputed premises within four months. In view of this, the suit, so far as the above defendants were concerned, was decreed on compromise and, in view of the same, the learned trial Judge did not deem it necessary to go into the question of default. That, however, does not seem to be quite satisfactory, particularly when a sub-tenant (Defendant No. 7) is also involved in this case and it would have been better if the relative Issue No. 3 had received greater attention from the parties and the court.