RAMANI MOHAN SEN Vs. SM. NILABJA BARANI DEBI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS rule is directed against an order of the learned District Judge, Burdwan, refusing to interfere under Section 40A of the Bengal Agricultural Act with an order of the Appellate Officer Katwa, affirming an award passed in favour of an applicant under Section 37A of the said Act.

(2.) THE proceedings have a long history. The sale in question was held in execution of a decree for rent on or about the 27th of August, 1937. The landlords decree -holders who were the Patnidarsthe defaulting property being a Dar Patni under them, of which the judgment -debtors were the tenants or Darpatnidarswere the purchasers. The sale was confirmed on or about the 31st of August, 1938. Thereafter, after the coming into force of the amended Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act introducing Section 37A into that statute the present opposite party, who was one of the tenants judgment -debtors, made an application under that section for reliefs provided therein. This application was filed on the 19th of May, 1943, It was, therefore, quite within the period of limitation, as provided under Sub -section (2) of that section.

(3.) IN support of this rule two points were urged by Mr. Roy who appeared for the petitioners. In the first place Mr. Roy contended that in view of Article 13(1) of the Constitution read with Article 19(1)(f) thereof, Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act must be held to be bad as it imposed unreasonable restrictions on the subject's right of property. For the purpose of the present case, however, it is not necessary for us to go into this difficult question. Admittedly, the present proceedings under Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act were pending on the day the Constitution came into force. It is clear also that the rights, involved in the present proceedings, were rights which had been acquired before the making of the said application under Section 37A, that is, long before the Constitution, and they were sought to be enforced by the making of that application. The application, as we have said, was made well within the time allowed by law. It has now been found, and that finding is no longer open to challenge, that the applicant fulfils all the conditions required by that statute for the acquisition or enforcement of the rights, claimed by her. It is true that this decision has been given after the Constitution had come into force, but the decision merely declares that in the case of the applicant those conditions had been duly fulfilled. In other words, the decision merely declares that the applicant had duly acquired the rights in question immediately on the introduction of Section 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act that is, in May 1942, which was long before the commencement of the Constitution, that she was entitled to enforce the same and had taken all necessary steps in that behalf. In such circumstances, it must be held that the rights in question were 'acquired rights' at the date the Constitution came into force which had been duly put into motion and were pending enforcement on that date in accordance with law.