BANWARILAL AGARWALLA Vs. SUDHAMOY BASU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An interesting question arises for discussion in the present case. The Petitioner is the tenant in respect of one shop room No. G.F. 5 in the ground floor of premises No. 201/A, Harrison Road, Calcutta. The opposite party is the receiver appointed in suit No. 1224 of 1950 of this Court on its Original Side in respect of the said premises and the Petitioner claims to hold the disputed shop room No. G.F. 5 under him as his landlord. The contractual rent was Rs. 65 per month. On the allegation that the said contractual rent was exorbitant the Petitioner applied before the rent controller, Calcutta, for fixation of the standard rent of the disputed shop room in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1950. That application was opposed by the opposite party on the merits and also on the ground that it was not maintainable in law as no leave of the Court, appointing him as receiver as aforesaid, had been obtained by the Petitioner for proceeding against him. This last objection, however, does not appear to have been considered by the rent controller and, as he found that on a proper assessment the Petitioner's standard rent under the Rent Control Act of 1950 should be Rs. 23-14 per month on the materials before him, he passed an order to that effect, giving necessary relief to the Petitioner on the merits of his application. The landlord opposite party appealed from this decision of the rent controller and the learned appellate Judge has now upheld the receiver landlord's contention that the application for standardisation of rent was not maintainable in law against him in the absence of leave of' the appointing Court and. in that view of the matter, he has dismissed the Petitioner's application without entering into its merits. Against this appellate decision the present Rule has been obtained by the Petitioner.

(2.) The Rule requiring leave to sue a receiver is not based on any statutory authority but had its origin on reasons or considerations of public policy [vide in this connection, Braja Bhusan Trigunait Vs. Sris Chandra Tewari A.I.R. [1918] (Pat.) 100 : 47 I.C. 719; vide also, Banku Behary Dey Vs. Harendra Nath Mukerjee (1910) 15 C.W.N. 54.] It is an ancient rule of salutary import which has for all practical purposes become a part of the law of the land. It has seldom been departed from in actual practice where actions of the receiver qua receiver in relation to the properties in his charge are in question. The rule covers a wide field. Its application is not limited to suits, strictly so-called, but also extends to other legal proceedings [vide in this connection, A.B. Miller Vs. Ram Ranjan Chakravarti (1884) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 1014; A.M. Dunne Vs. Kumar Chandra Kissore (1902) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 593; W.R. Fink Vs. The Corporation of Calcutta (1903) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 721; Santok Chand Vs. Sugan Chand Mahawat (1918) I.L.R. 46 Cal. 432; Mrs. Levina Ashton Vs. Madhabmoni Dasi (1910) 14 C.W.N. 560; Jotindra Nath Choudhury Vs. Sarfaraj Mia (1910) 14 C.W.N. 653; Banku Behari Dey Vs. Harendra Nath Mukerjee (1910) 15 C.W.N. 54; and Sarat Chandra Banerjee Vs. Apurba Krishna Roy (1911) 15 C.W.N. 925]. The basic principle on which the rule is founded is unexceptionable and, as the appointing Court has a judicial discretion in the matter of granting such leave, and, as, in practice, such leave is readily granted in appropriate cases, the rule has very seldom worked any injustice. When the Court appoints a receiver over a particular property it is the Court which really takes charge of the same. The property remains in the custody and management of the Court-it does not, strictly speaking, vest in the receiver where the appointment is, as in the present case, under Order 40, Rule 1, of the Code [vide, Maharana Kunwar Vs. E.V. David, A.I.R. 1924 (All.) 40 : I.L.R. 45 All. 16; Shyam Lal Gomatwala Vs. Nand Lal and Ors., A.I.R. [1944] (All.) 220 : I.L.R. [1944] All. 255; vide also in this connection, Haji Cassim Mamooji Vs. K.B. Dutt (1914) 19 C.W.N. 45] and the receiver merely acts as the Court's officer in the matter of such management. It is only proper, therefore, and, indeed, it is imperative for the maintenance of the dignity of the Courts and respect for the judiciary, so essential for a stable administration, that the property or any rights therein should not be allowed to be affected or interfered with without the leave of the said appointing Court and the persons, desiring to take any step which might affect the said property or any rights therein, should be obliged to obtain that Court's leave in that behalf. Such leave, as we have said above, is freely granted in appropriate cases. Its requirement, therefore, places no obstacle in the way of justice; on the other hand, it is clearly conducive to a sound judicial administration, avoiding chaos and confusion, which might otherwise ensue. It seems to us, therefore, that on principle the rule should have a wide application and as a proceeding for standardisation of rent may well affect the income or the payment to be made for occupation of the disputed property and may thus conceivably affect the said property, or, to be more precise, rights and liabilities of the parties in respect thereof in the matter of rent, there is no reason why the rule should not apply to such a proceeding.

(3.) The learned advocate for the Petitioner has, however, urged several grounds in support of the present rule. He has first contended that the reasons of public policy on which the rule is founded do not apply to proceedings for standardisation of rent. We have explained above the basic or the underlying reasons of the rule and we have shown also that those reasons cover a wide field. Indeed, the reasons are such as make the rule applicable to all actions against the receiver qua receiver in respect of the property in his charge and a proceeding for standardisation of rent, seeking to affect, as it does, the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect of the disputed premises in the matter of rent, is not outside its pale but is well within the reasons of the rule. To such a case, therefore, the rule cannot be refused application on the ground that it is outside its reasons and the Petitioner's first contention must, accordingly, fail.