(1.) This case is one of the classic examples of the miseries of a person who after successfully litigating for number of years obtained the possession with due process of law and have been forcibly dispossessed in the hands of the ousted tenant. The suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 instituted in the year 2002 alleging the forcible dispossession by the evicted tenants has not reached its finality.
(2.) The short fact which emerges from the respective stands of the parties are jotted down for convenience in deciding the issues involved in the instant case.
(3.) The plaintiff/opposite party filed the Title Suit No. 94 of 2002 against the petitioners before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Chandannagore under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 claiming a relief of recovery of possession in respect of one pucca brick built room on the ground floor at Premises No. 3, Nimtala Lane, P.S. Bhadreswar, District: Hooghly. The plaintiff/opposite party claimed title in respect of the said premises by dint of purchase dated 4th February 1981 from the erstwhile owner, Brojendra Nath Mukhopadhyay on valuable consideration. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was a recorded monthly tenant in respect of two bed rooms with verandah in the ground floor of the said premises at a monthly rental of Rs.80/- payable according to English Calendar. One Naba Kumar Karmakar was also a monthly tenant in respect of a room adjacent to the rooms of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners at a monthly rental of Rs. 40/- payable according to English Calendar. After the purchase, the request were made to give up, deliver and vacate the possession to the respective tenants when the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners refused to accede to such request whereas the other tenant namely Naba Kumar Karmakar handed over the vacant and khas possession of his tenanted room which is a subject matter of the instant suit on or about 3 March, 1982. The plaintiffs claimed to be in possession of the said room since after the acceptance of the surrender by the said erstwhile tenant. Because of the refusal to hand over the vacant and khas possession of the tenanted rooms by the predecessor-in-title of the present petitioner, a Title Suit No. 10 of 1988 was instituted before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Chandannagore seeking an eviction on the ground of default, violation of Clauses (m) (o) (p) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and reasonable requirement. In the said suit, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed who inspected the premises in question and submitted a report. The report further reveals that the predecessor-in-title of the opposite party admitted the actual and physical possession of the plaintiff/opposite party in respect of the suit room upon surrendered by the other erstwhile tenant. The said suit was ultimately decreed on April 27, 1998 against the predecessor-in-title of the present petitioner. Although, the Title Execution Case no. 19 of 1998 was levied but because of the initiation of the Title Appeal No. 100 of 1998 before the District Judge, Chinsurah, the said execution case could not be proceeded with. The title appeal also stood dismissed and the second appeal could not yield fruitful result as the same was dismissed at the stage of Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code. The High Court while dismissing the second appeal granted the predecessor-ininterest of the present petitioner to vacate and deliver up the possession of the said premises in question within a period of one year, on filing an undertaken that during the said period, the predecessor-in-title would pay the arrear rent and the current damages and/or mesne profit together with the decreetal costs. In spite of an undertaken so given, the predecessor-intitle did not vacate the suit premises but, in turn, applied for an extension of time to vacate which was rejected by the division bench of this Court and directed the Superintendent of Police to deliver the peaceful and vacant possession of the premises in question on April 30, 2002. In terms of the order of the division bench passed in the said second appeal, the possession was handed over to the plaintiff/opposite party who kept the said premises in question under lock and key.