BARUNDEV CHOWDHURY Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE writ petitioner in this writ petition joined Indian Navy as apprentice on January 29, 1997. He was declared unsuccessful. However, he was given a chance to appear for the examination before the Board on February 26, 2001. On 23 -3 -2001 the petitioner was intimated that he has been discharged by an order dated 9th March, 2001 with effect from March 22, 2001. As such the petitioner worked for two years or more and he was discharged. At the present moment without going into the factual details regarding charge -sheet or proceeding etc. it can be said that the father of the petitioner made a representation and a reply was given by the Lt. Commander Administrative Officer to the father of the petitioner that the petitioner has been discharged from Naval services. The petitioner was awarded punishment. Challenging the said punishment the petitioner moved this writ petition.

(2.) AT the outset before the learned counsel for the petitioner intended to make his submissions on merit, the learned Counsel for the Union of India, Mrs. Archana Sengupta raised a preliminary objection submitting inter alia that the petition is not maintainable inasmuch as this is not within the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. In support of her contention Mrs. Sengupta submitted that the memo dated 9th March, 2001 discharging the petitioner from services was issued by the Commander from Kochi which is not within the jurisdiction of this High Court. Mrs. Sengupta also submits that the communication regarding discharge from naval service was sent to the father of the petitioner on 23 -3 -2001 was also issued by the Lt. Commander whose office was at Kochi. In summary Mrs. Sengupta submits that the Annexures P/6 and P/8 to the writ petition which are under the challenge are the Memos issued from Kochi. Mrs Sengupta further submits that from the cause title of the writ petition it will appear that the office of the respondent Nos. 3 to 7 are beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this High Court. According to Mrs. Sengupta, the entire cause of action arose outside the jurisdiction of this High Court and as such this writ petition is not maintainable here and this Court has no jurisdiction to here out this petition. In this context, Mrs. Sengupta relies on an unreported judgment delivered by the Hon 'ble Division Bench presided over by the Hon 'ble Chief Justice in FMA 952 of 1990 (Director, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Jeet Pal). The learned counsel for the respondents Mrs. Sengupta lays stress on a particular paragraph of this judgment which is quoted herein below : ''We have carefully considered the averments in the writ petition. In the present writ petition primarily the order passed by the Add1. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay issuing a show -cause notice to the writ petitioner asking them to show -cause as to why the criminal case should not be revived has been challenged. The learned single Judge by order impugned stayed the show -cause notice relating to revival of the said criminal case before the learned Add1. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bombay and directed that no further action should be taken for revival of the said case. In our view, taking all effective steps in support of cause of action, it cannot be said that any part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because, the show -cause was served at Calcutta or that some of the respondents were having their offices at Calcutta cannot convert jurisdiction to this Court. We hold that mere service of notice not a fact giving rise to cause of action, unless such notice is an integral part of cause of action. ''

(3.) MRS . Sengupta then relied upon another decision reported in AIR 1985 SC 1289 (State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties). Relying on this decision Mrs. Sengupta submits that mere service of notice does not give rise to cause of action in West Bengal, Calcutta and the Hon 'ble Apex Court in this decision observed that Calcutta High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain petition challenging acquisition.