(1.) This Revisional application was moved before us on 10th of May, 1991 when it was directed to appear as a contested application four weeks after the Summer holidays and the petitioner was directed to serve a copy of the application on the opposite party viz., State of West Bengal through the Land Acquisition Collector and 'affirm an affidavit of service. In pursuance of that direction, the matter was called on 29th of January, 1992 when an affidavit of service was tiled on behalf of the petitioner, but since none appeared on behalf of the Opposite Party (State), we directed the petitioner to serve a written notice on the office of the learned Legal Remembrancer, West Bengal, conveying the fixation of the matter, once again by us on the Wednesday following. The matter was appearing in the list and has been called on today for being heard out when receipted copy of a notice served on the office of the Legal Rememberancer, West Bengal has been produced by Mr. Bakshi, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, showing service of the intended notice on the Legal Remembrancer's office on 30th of January, 1992. We are keeping the said receipted notice on record. Still then nobody appears when the matter is taken up for hearing today and, accordingly, we have heard out the petitioner alone in connection with the Civil Revisional application.
(2.) The lands in question were acquired by Notification dated 30th April, 1966 and proceeding for vesting of the land under West Bengal Estates 14cquisition Act had been initiated in the year .1969. The proceeding culminated with an order of vesting and dated 25th of June, 1979 and in course of hearing of the Reference before the Land Acquisition Judge, on behalf of the State it was urged for the first time that the petitioner was not entitled to any compensation whatsoever because the lands which had been acquired were vested lands. The learned Land Acquisition Judge, by the impugned order upheld the contention advanced on behalf of the government that the absence of any riot of the petitioner to compensation on the ground of the lands being vested could be urged in course of a Reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The instant Revisional application is directed against the said impugned order. It has been strenuously argued on behalf of the petitioner that in a proceeding under section 18 of the, Land Acquisition Act it is not open to the Land Acquisition Judge to go into such a contention.
(3.) Part III of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act") dealing with the Reference to Court and procedure thereon embodies sections 18 to 28. A careful reading of the said sections clearly indicates the scope of Reference made under section 18, as in the instant case, and the matters which may fall for determination in connection with or in deciding such Reference. Sub-section (1) of section 18 delineates such matters as (a) objection to the measurement of the land, (b) amount of compensation, (c) the persons to whom it is payable and (d) apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. For the materials to be considered, reference may be made to sections 19, 20 and 23 of the said Act. The question of disentitlement which has now been raised, in the context of the aforesaid statutory provisions, in our view, does not fall within the scope of the present reference. The initiation of a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, presumes the existence of the interest with regard to the land or lands as defined in the said Act in the claimants and the very idea of the State acquiring the land, which belonged to State itself, is contradiction in terms, if not, fallacious. We derive support and justification for our above view from the decisions in the cases of British India Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State 15 CWN 87 and lmdad Ali Khan v. Collector of Farakhabad reported in ILR VII (Allababad) 817 (Division Bench) and followed in case of Babujan v. Secretary of State reported in 4 CalLJ 257 We feel inclined to quote the observations made by the Division Bench in the second case, which run as follows :-