(1.) THE petitioners obtained those six rules under art 227 of the constitution against the order o the commissioner presidency division acting as the ASppllate Authority under secation 33 of the ueban land (celling and Regulation)Act 1976 the petitioners had preferred the side appeals against the order of the competent Authority of Barrackpore disposing of under secation 9 of the side Act Returns submitted by the petitioners under secation 6 (1) of the side Act.
(2.) THE principal point of controversy was whether the lands in question were vacant lands within the meaning of the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act or whether they were being use J mainly for the purpose of agriculture at the relevant date. The Competent Authority, Barrack pore had overruled the claim of the petitioners that the said lands were being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture and therefore they were not liable to vest as excess lands under the aforesaid Act.
(3.) IN our view, the impugned order of the commissioner, Presidency Division, acting as the Appellate Authority ought to be set aside and the appeals remitted back for fresh disposal in accordance with law. On 10th April, 1980 the Competent Authority had heard the parties and had reserved his orders. The Competent Authority in its order had relied upon a certified copy of the extract from the Assessment Register of Kamarhai Municipality. It appears that the said certified copy was granted by the municipality only on 12th April, 1980, i. e. , after the Competent Authority had already heard the parties and had reserved his orders. The Appellate Authority was undoubtedly right in holding that according to section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, documents forming the acts and records of the official bodies and public offices are public documents. Certified copies of the said records would be admissible in evidence without calling for or proving their originals. But the Appellate Authority had committed a jurisdictional error by overlooking the provisions of section 35 of the indian Evidence Act under which the said copies would be relevant evidence and therefore, acting as a quasi judicial authority the Competent Authority was bound to give opportunities to the petitioners to lead evidence controverting the presumption. arising from the said entries in respect of the disputed lands. In the instant case the said certified copy of the Municipal Register was brought on record after conclusion of hearing before the Competent Authority. Therefore, obviously the petitioners had no such opportunity to adduce rebutting evidence. We add, however, that by the expression "rebutting evidence" we do not mean adducing oral evidence. The same may consist of any documentary evidence or affidavit evidence by the competent persons. Therefore, we propose to direct the appellate Authority to re-hear the appeals by considering the evidence or record including the extracts from the said municipal records along with any rebutting evidence and affidavit evidence which I may by produced by the appellants within one month of service of notice of arrival of records upon the appellants.