(1.) This is an application for vacating the interim order passed by this Court on 11.8.81, filed by respondent No. 10, Dr. Jayanta Kumar Banerjee. It has been stated in the petition that respondent No. 10 was appointed temporarily as the Principal of Bijoy Narayan Mahavidyalaya on the basis of the selection made by the College Service Commission. The interim order that was made by this Court at the time of issuance of the Rule on 11.8.81 was in the following terms : -
(2.) Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing in support of the application, has submitted before this Court that the interim order stood vacated in view of the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as after the filing of the application on 18.2.82 the application was not heard within two weeks as required under the provisions of Article 226(3) of the Constitution and as such the interim order died its natural death, or in other words, is no longer in existence. It has been next submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that the list that has been prepared after holding the interview of different candidates by the College Service Commission, was not prepared on the basis of merits and as such even if it is assumed without admitting that the name of the petitioner of the original writ petition, viz., Dr. Baidyanath Mukherjee though appears in Item No. 1 in the selection list, that does not entitle him to get any preference in the matter of appointment of Principal over all other candidates including respondent No. 10 who had also been selected by the College Service Commission for being considered for appointment in the post of Principal in Government-Sponsored-Colleges. It has been thirdly submitted that true that the petitioner of the writ petition had indicated in his application which he filed pursuant to the advertisement made by the College Service Commission for empanelment of the candidates for appointment of Principal in Government-Sponsored-Colleges, the petitioner expressly mentioned his option for being appointed as Principal in the "Bijoy Narayan Mahavidyalaya at Itachuna" or any other place nearer his permanent residence, but this does not enjoin that the authorities concerned are to give him appointment as Principal in the Bijoy Narayan Mahavidyalaya. It is a mere option that was asked for in the advertisement inviting application made at the instance of the College Service Commission. Therefore, it has been submitted that the petitioner's claim for appointment in this particular college as Principal has got no legal basis nor the authorities concerned can be compelled to issue appointment letter in favour of the petitioner in this particular college. It has been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that the balance of convenience and inconvenience is also in favour of vacating the interim order as it has been submitted with great perseverance by Mr. Chatterjee that the petitioner has been working as a Principal in Assansol College whereas respondent No. 10 is not working anywhere and this particular college at Itachuna is without a Principal even though the College Service Commission had asked the college at Itachuna to appoint respondent No. 10 as Principal and an appointment was made by the President of the Governing Body of the College on 13.8.81 but in view of the interim order made by this Court the President by his letter dated 13.8.81 intimated respondent No. 10 not to join service till the interim order is vacated or the matter is finally disposed of. It has been, therefore, urged by Mr. Chatterjee that the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of vacating the interim order. Mr. Chattejree went to the extent of urging before this Court that this high prerogative writ jurisdiction should not be made as "discriminate use" of and as such the interim order should be vacated. He further submitted that if any interim order is made it should be made in the form that the appointment be given but it will abide by the result of the Rule. Mr. Chatterjee has also dealt at length by referring to the averments made in paragraph 5 of the writ petition where the petitioner has stated that he has come to know that the Service Commission after interviewing various candidates who appeared before Commission prepared a list and in order of merit the name of the petitioner was placed in Item No. 1. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the averments of this paragraph has been made as true to his knowledge. But nothing has been said from which this knowledge has been derived. In this circumstance this averment is not to be taken into consideration. It is a mere case of suspicion, as such on a mere plea of suspicion this Court should not make any interim order. It has been further submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that there is no representation before the College Service Commission by the petitioner and the representation that has been made to the Secretary, Education Department, Government of West Bengal as well as to the Chief Minister to this matter by the petitioner does not amount to demand of justice which is an essential pre-requisite in coming to this Writ Court with a prayer for a Writ in the nature of Mandamus and as such this essential pre-requisite having not been complied with, the writ application and for that the interim order should not be allowed to continue at all and the same should be vacated immediately, if in case it is held that the interim order is continuing. Lastly, Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that the decision cited on behalf of the petitioner, viz., that even if it is assumed that interim order has lapsed as the application for variation of the interim order was not heard within a period of two weeks from the date of filing the said application, there is no application before the Court for issuance of a fresh interim order and the only application before this Court is this application for vacating the interim order and as such the question of issuing a fresh interim order cannot and does not, under any circumstance, arise.
(3.) I am really sorry to say at the out-set that the scope and amplitude of writ jurisdiction and its applicability have been well settled by several pronouncements of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court. It is too late in the day to urge before this Court where this writ jurisdiction is to be exercised and to caution the Court that there should not be an indiscriminate use of this jurisdiction. It is the basic and cardinal principle of Article 226 of the Constitution which confers its extraordinary jurisdiction to prevent illegal interference, arbitrary action, and unreasonable orders affecting the rights of the parties; does not matter whether the order is made by a quasi-judicial tribunal or by an administrative authority, and it is well-settled by the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Fertiliser Corporation, Kamagar Union v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1981 SC 344 that a person whose proprietary right or whose legal right has not been apparently affected but when it is found that he is really aggrieved, such a person can come before this Court for redress of his grievances and it is within the jurisdiction of this Writ Court to afford appropriate relief if it is of opinion that the person has been aggrieved by an order of an administrative authority. I do not want to deal with this matter any longer.