HIRENDRA NATH BAKSHI Vs. RAM JAUHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an interlocutory application for injunction restraining the respondent No. 2, Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinatfer called the L. I. C.) and its servants, agents, representatives, assigns, employees or otherwise from giving effect to or implementing the notice dated April 1 1972 and the enquiry report dated April 19, 1971 in any manner whatsoever pending the disposal of this suit. The notice dated April 1, 1972 is a show cause notice. By this notice the L. I. C. is calling upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from the service of the L.I.C.

(2.) This show cause notice is given on the findings of the report of the enquiry officer dated April 9, 1971 that the petitioner is guilty of getting a cheque dated November 11, 1966 drawn by the L. I. C. in favour of the respondent No. 1 Shreeram Jauhar for Rs. 1,323.10 encashed through his personal bank account and misappropriating the proceeds of the cheque. On this finding, of the enquiry officer, the L. I. C. proposed to dismiss the petitioner from service in terms of Regulation 39 (1g) of the L. I. C. Staff Regulations, 1960. The petitioner wants that this Court should issue an order of injunction restraining the L. I. C. from dismissing the petitioner. This prayer of the petitioner, prima facie, means that the petitioner wants by an ad interim order to enforce specifically that his employer should not dismiss him but he should be allowed to continue in service. In other words, the petitioner by an ad interim order wants specific performance of his contract of employment Prima facie, this could not be done but the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Dipankar Ghose relied upon a very recent decision of Lord Denning. M. R. reported in 1971 (3) WLR page 995 = (1971) 3 All ER (Hill v. C. A. Parson & Co.) page 1345 and submitted that very recently the Court of Appeal in England presided over by Lord Denning by a majority judgment has Issued an injunction restraining the employer from treating a notice of termination of service as having determined the plaintiff's employment and thus have indirectly granted specific performance of a contract of personal service by interlocutory injunction. It was submitted that I should follow the principles of this case and similarly grant him injunction,

(3.) The question is whether I should issue an order of interim injunction in this case as prayed.