LAWS(CAL)-1972-2-1

ASWINI KUMAR BARIK Vs. FULKUMARI DASSI

Decided On February 24, 1972
ASWINI KUMAR BARIK Appellant
V/S
FULKUMARI DASSI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a second appeal from the judgment of the district Judge of Bankura delivered on the 18th January 1963 affirming the judgment of the Munsif at Bishnupur delivered on the 15th September, 1960. The courts below have found that the plaintiff was born on the 23rd April, 1935. In 1938, when the plaintiff was only three years old, she was married to one Surendra Nath Kundu since deceased. She was taken to her husband's place when she was six or seven years of age and became a widow at the age of about nine or ten. Thereafter she came to her father's house:

(2.) ON the 20th November, 1944 the plaintiff's father alienated certain properties which the plaintiff had inherited from her husband. The alience was the defendant No. 1. On March 24, 1950 the defendant No. 1 sold small portions of these properties to the defendants nos. 1 (ka) to l (gha ). The plaintiff attained majority on the 23rd April, 1953. She instituted the suit on April 24, 1956. The first prayer in the plaint is a prayer for setting aside the alienation on the ground that it was not made either for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate of the plaintiff. This prayer is rather unhappy and need not have been made at all on the facts of this case. In the second prayer, however, the plaintiff has asked for possession of the properties in suit obviously on the basis that the alienations were void.

(3.) THE suit has been dismissed against the defendants Nos. 1 (Ka) to l (gha) on the ground of limitation. With respect to the other properties, however, both the courts below have come to the conclusion, on the evidence on record, that the alienations were not made for legal necessity. In this second appeal we were invited to reconsider whether this decision of the courts below was correct. But we do not find any scope for such reconsideration. In any event, upon going through the evidence, it does not appear to us that either the trial court or the first Appellate Court had erred in their conclusions on facts.