(1.) This Rule is directed against a notification under Section 4 and a declaration made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquisition of a large tract of land with the apparent purpose of establishment of a modem slaughter house. The case was argued, on behalf of the petitioners, with a good deal of political fervour, not quite appropriate before a Court of law. In showing cause, the respondents took up an attitude of bureaucratic infallibility, which was unhelpful in resolving the dispute. I, therefore, asked Mr. Jajneswar Majumdar, the learned Additional Government Pleader, to help me as amicus curiae. His arguments were more helpful than the lines of argument adopted (sic) on behalf of the petitioners or on behalf of (sic) respondents.
(2.) The circumstances leading to the present dispute are hereinafter briefly recounted. On February 18, 1960, there was published, in the Calcutta Gazette, a notification, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, whereby a large number of plots of land, measuring in all 106.19 acres, in village Mrigala, Police station Chanditala, District Hooghly were notified for acquisition "for a public purpose, not being a purpose of the Union, namely, the establishment of a modern slaughter-house". The notified plots were described in two schedules -- Schedule "A" containing plots which were said to be waste and arable and Schedule "B" containing plots other than waste and arable. In the notification it was further stated as follows :
(3.) The petitioners challenge the acquisition of the land on various grounds. They say that the establishment of a slaughter-house is not and cannot be a public purpose. They further say that in the absence of legislative sanction the executive authority of the state is not competent to engage in the business of a slaughter house and compulsorily to acquire land therefor. They also say that the provision of Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act is void under Articles 13 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and is not saved by Article 19(5) of the Constitution. They say, lastly, that the purpose of acquisition was beyond the spirit and intendment of Article 48 of the Constitution and should not be upheld as a public purpose.