NATIONAL COMPANY LTD Vs. BISESWARILAL AND CO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application for an order that Title Suit No. 235 of 1961 in the City Civil Court be stayed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The other order prayed for is that the respondent, its agents and servants be restrained from proceeding further or taking any steps in the said title suit pending in the City Civil Court. Counsel for the, petitioner abandoned the application in so far as it related to the prayer for injunction.

(2.) THE only point in this application is whether there can be an order under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The suit is pending in the City Civil Court. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the City Civil Court Act shows that the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction in Arbitration Acts and it will appear from the objects and reasons of City Civil Court Act that one of the reasons for that enactment is relief of congestion in the High Court, and therefore this court would exercise jurisdiction in matters which are not specifically conferred upon the City Civil Court by the City Civil Court Act. In other words the contention is that in so far as the Arbitration Act is concerned, since the High Court has jurisdiction in Arbitration matters' this Court will exercise jurisdiction in suits which are pending in the City Civil Court. Counsel for the petitioner referred to some decisions of v. the Supreme Court, Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras (1) A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 274 on the observations appearing at p. 276 of the report that all parts of a statute are to be read together, State of W. B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. , (2) A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 92 that the objects and reasons of a statute can be looked at and Rajkrishna Bose v. Binod Kanungo (3) A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 202 that the court should attempt a harmonious construction of the statute. These principles are well settled. On the other hand it is equally well settled that if the clear words of a statute point to a conclusion or construction, then that construction has to be accepted. In the present case the language of section 34 of the Arbitration Act lays down in unmistakable terms that the jurisdiction under section 34 is in the court before which the proceedings are pending.

(3.) AS to whether the City Civil Court has or has no jurisdiction under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, counsel for the respondent contended that the question was not free from difficulty and I do not express any views on the question. In Kamal Brothers and Ors. v. Hansraj Kapur, (4) A. I. R. 1959 Cal. 583 an application was made for an injunction restraining the respondent from proceeding with a suit pending in the City Civil Court. In Kamal Brothers' case the suit was instituted in the City Civil Court and an application was made in this court for stay of the suit. The respondent there had earlier filed a suit in the High Court which was stayed under section 34. Pursuant to the order the disputes were referred to arbitration and a counsel of this court was appointed as an Umpire. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Umpire the respondent instituted the suit in the City Civil Court. In the facts and circumstances of this case it was held that the arbitration agreement had not been superseded and on the contrary by an order of this court the Umpire was proceeding with the reference and the arbitration proceedings were prior in point of time and the suit in the City Civil Court was instituted to take out the question of the tenancy right being adjudicated by the Umpire. Under those circumstances it was held that a case for injunction for a limited period had been made out. There it was ordered that in the interest of justice the proper order in that was to issue an injunction from proceeding with the suit in the City Civil Court for a period of four months. The peculiar circumstances and facts of that case are entirely inappropriate to the present case. Furthermore, as counsel for the respondent in my view rightly contended, Kamal Brothers' case is not an authority for the proposition that the suit in the City Civil Court can be stayed under section 34. In the case of Radhakissen Dhannka v. Bombay C. Ltd. , (5) I. L. R. 56 Cal. 755 Lort Williams, J. held that the small Causes Court has no jurisdiction to grant a stay of suit under the provisions of section 19 of the then Arbitration Act. Under the old Act the language of section 19 corresponding to the present section 34 was different. Under section 19 of the old Arbitration Act where a party to a submission commenced legal proceedings, any party to such proceedings could apply to the court to stay the proceedings. The court in the old Act was to mean in the Presidency Towns the High Court. Therefore under the old Act the High Court was the proper court for exercising power of stay under the Arbitration though the suit was instituted in the Small Causes Court, Calcutta. The language of section 34 is entirely different and to my mind it is indisputable that the court where the proceeding is instituted is the only court to exercise power under section 34. If section 34 does not apply to the City Civil Court I can not interpret section 34 in the manner suggested, for that would be engrafting on the statute words entirely opposed to the words used in the statute. The question came up for consideration in another decision of this court: Basanti Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Dhingra Bros. , (6) I. L. R. 1950 (I) Cal 546. It was held there that on the language of the present section 34 the conclusion which had been reached in Dhanuka's case (5) could not apply.