AMAL KRISHNA BASU Vs. CHANDI CHARAN BANERJEE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Rule was obtained by the plaintiffs landlords in a suit for ejectment against an order passed by the Sixth Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, directing under Section 14 (1), West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, the tenant defendant to pay Rs. 5057/14/- by 28-1-1952. This was the amount which the learned Judge found due on account of arrears and interest on calculation in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 (1). The suit was filed by the plaintiffs on 10-10-1950 on the allegation that prior to that date there had been defaults in the payment of arrears of rents from May. On 5-12-1950, the defendant appeared and filed an application for an order under Section 14 (1). This application was disposed of fay the learned Judge on 17-3-1951 by an order which is in these words.

(2.) The amount was not deposited, and the hearing of the suit proceeded. Finally on 11-1-1952 the learned Judge being of opinion that the defendant was entitled to an order under provisions of Section 14 (1), passed an order as mentioned above. The first ground on which this order is challenged is that there having been already an application under Section 14 (1), on 5-12-1950 on which an order was actually passed on 17-3-1951, the Court had no jurisdiction to pass a further order in terms of Section 14 (1) of the Act. Whatever might be said for the proposition of law that once an order is passed under Section 14 (1), the Court has no power to pass, after that order has been disobeyed a further order under the provisions of the same Section, it is not necessary for us to consider that question here. The position here is that the Court did not in fact pass an order under Section 14 (1). Mr. Banerjee has contended that the terms of the order were in substance under the provisions of Section 14(1). If there had been no saving words used by the learned Judge that the order was without prejudice to the determination of the question whether Section 14(1) was applicable or not, we might have accepted this contention. In view of the clear words used by the learned Judge, we have come to the conclusion that he did not decide whether Section 14 (1) was applicable and did not purport to pass an order under the provision of that section. The first ground, therefore, fails.

(3.) This brings us to the next contention urged by Mr. Banerjee. This is that as at the date the present order was passed, the tenant had been in default in payment of rent from May 1950 to December 1951, the proviso to Section 14 (3), is a bar to the defendant getting any benefit under the provision of Section 14. The proviso is in these words: