(1.) This is an appeal by the Director of Consumer Goods, West Bengal, and also by the State of West Bengal against a Judgment of Bose J. by which he allowed an application filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(2.) The facts which are material for the purpose of this appeal may be briefly stated as follows: The respondent Is a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act and carries on the business of manufacture of an adhesive substance known as P. B. Clay which is intended for use in building works. The respondent has been carrying on this business since 1943 and the Government of India acting under the Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Ordinance (No. XXXV of 1943) fixed the price of P. B. Clay Between the years 1943 and 1948, the respondent used to sell the products at the prices fixed by the Government of India. According to the report of the Government Test House at Alipore, dated October 20, 1943 cement was no part of the composition of P. B. Clay but subsequently cement was used as an essential ingredient of the respondent's products and it is now admitted that cement does form an essential ingredient of P. B. Clay. The report of the Director of Industries, dated August 31, 1949, which was submitted after examining the manufacturing process of P. B. Clay, shows that a certain quantity of cement not exceeding 10 per cent is required for its manufacture. Under the West Bengal Cement Control Ordinance which was replaced by the West Bengal Cement Control Act, (West Bengal Act XXVI of 1948), cement became a controlled commodity from 1948 and it became impossible for the respondent to acquire or buy or deal in cement except under a permit granted by the Government of West Bengal. Thereafter the respondent obtained permits for 50 tons of cement every month up to March 1950. On March 13, 1950, the respondent wrote a letter to the Director of Consumer Goods, West Bengal, surrendering the permits for 150 tons of cement issued for the months of October, November and December 1949 stating that on account of depression in the trade it was not economical to purchase imported cement at controlled rates. On March 15, 1950, the respondent wrote another letter stating that it had obtained permits for 150 tons of cement for the months of January, February and March 1950 but could obtain delivery of only 75 tons within the period limited by the permits and requested the authorities to extend the validity of the permits for 20 days more. No reply appears to have been given to this letter. Thereafter the respondent made several applications on August 7, 1950, November 3, 1950, April 16, 1951, and May 14, 1951, for getting its monthly quota of cement but received no reply to the said applications. It may be mentioned that the respondent received two ad hoc quotas of 50 tons each for the months of December 1950 and March 1951 but received no quotas for the remainder of the period from April 1950.
(3.) The respondent's case is that its industry depends upon the supply of cement and as the supply has been stopped since the month of April 1950 except two ad hoc quotas referred to above the respondent had to incur heavy loss in its business and in fact the industry was threatened with collapse. The respondent accordingly made an application to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution alleging that it had a fundamental right to carry on this business and as such it was entitled to get a certain quantity of cement every month for the manufacture of P. B. Clay. In paragraph 22 of the petition it was alleged that it was incumbent on the appellants before us under the West Bengal Cement Control Act 1948 to grant licence or permit or order in favour of the respondent for acquisition, use or consumption of cement and that it was equally incumbent upon the appellants before us to forbear from withholding any licence or permit or order. The respondent further alleged in the petition that the authorities concerned acted mala fide, arbitrarily and unlawfully in withholding the permit and were influenced by the fact that the political predilections of the partners of the respondent were disagreeable to them.