NIKHIL CHAND CHATTOPADHYAY Vs. STATE & ORS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The instant revisional application is arising out of an order passed by the Land Acquisition Collector, Howrah in connection with an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act on 3rd April, 2008 in dismissing the said reference on the ground of limitation. In considering the said application, the learned Collector has taken into consideration that one Gora Chand Chattopadhyay presumably the son of the deceased owner Rakhal Chandra Chattopadhyay received the notice of the notification which ultimately resulted an award being passed in favour of Rakhal Chandra Chattopadhyay on 12th September, 1988. The learned Collector was of the view since Gora Chand Chattopadhyay even after becoming aware of the acquisition proceeding in the year 1984 did not show any interest to have himself substituted in the place of his deceased father during his life time, the son after a lapse of 19 years 6 months could not be permitted to initiate a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

(2.) It is clear from a bare reading of the said provision that the right to challenge the award would only arise provided the said award is served upon the awardee. Only because the grandson challenged the award after 19 years, the statutory obligation of the Authorities concerned cannot be ignored. Sometime a compensation remains pending over a decade. It is not in dispute that the awarded has lost compensation of a very valuable piece of land being acquired by the State on the principle of eminent domain. The Act gives right to an aggrieved awardee to initiate a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(3.) Mr. Hiranmoy Bhattacharyya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon a decision in the case of Rajah Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, 1961 AIR(SC) 1500 and submitted that it is incumbent upon the Statutory Authorities to ensure that the award is served upon the Authority. In Rajah Harish it was held that where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of a remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. So the limitation runs from the date of knowledge of the said order and not from the date of passing of the said order. Mere knowledge of the pendency of the acquisiton proceeding is not enough. Limitation starts from the actual date of the knowledge of the award. In terms of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 the date on which the award is pronounced has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation under Section 18(2), proviso. In case the claimant got an intimation of the award only on the date on which he received the compensation under protest, which was not effectively rebutted, the application for reference filed within six months of the receipt of the compensation under protest is within time.