ASHOKE KUMAR RAI Vs. ASHOKE ARORA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal under section 19(l)(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court passed on a contempt application in CO. No. 4076 of 1990 wherein the learned Judge held the appellant guilty of contempt and directed him to purge the contempt by making redelivery of possession of the concerned property by a certain date. It was also indicated by the learned Judge that in the event of his failure to comply. with the order the court might be under a painful duty to confine the contemner in civil prison. It is indeed a case of civil contempt.

(2.) A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents that the appeal is not maintainable on the ground that the impugned order does not impose any punishment for contempt and no appeal lies under the said section 19 against any order passed in any proceeding for contempt except against an order of punishment imposed upon a contemner in terms of section 12 of the Act! Here let us look to the historical background of the contempt jurisdiction exercised by the High Court. Article 215 of the Constitution of India provides that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Neither the said Article 215 nor any other Article of the Constitution defines what a court of record is nor -delineates what is meant by "all the power of such a court" except making an inclusive reference to the power to punish for contempt of itself out' of the multidimensional powers capsulized within the contours of the expression "all the powers of such a court". As a matter of historical fact the High Court being a superior court has always enjoyed the status of a court of record and has exercised the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. It is not difficult to see that Article 215 recognizes the existent powers of the High Court as a court of record rather than creates or confers such power. In this connection, we may also refer to the following observations of a Division Bench of this Court in S. K. Gupta v. B. K. Sen, AIR 1959 Cal 106 :

(3.) The law of contempt has developed as a part of the Common Law. The power to deal with contempt has been treated as an inherent power of a Court of Record. There are decisions of English Courts from early times where the courts assumed jurisdiction in taking committal proceedings against persons who were guilty of publishing scandalous matter in respect of the court itself. The power summarily to commit for contempt is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice (see Brahma Prakash v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10 : 1954 Cr. W 238). Generally speaking contempt is not regarded as an ordinary offence. Sovereignty of the State is a two dimensional concept. The foreign aspect of this dimension relates to the territorial and political sovereignty of the State which is protected mainly by the armed forces. On the other hand the domestic aspect of this dimension relates to maintenance of law and order within the boundaries of the State. Making of law for the governance of the subjects defining their rights, duties and liabilities inter se as well as vis-a-vis the State itself and the enforcement thereof are acts of the State falling within its sovereignty jurisdiction. The court functioning as the arbiter of legal wrangles and penal awards acts as sentinel of the domestic sovereignty of the State. Without Court which is the adjudication machinery of the State, the administration of law and justice would have been in utter chaos and quandary leading to counter-productive sequels threatening to de-stabilise or attenuate the attributes of domestic sovereignty. Contumacious attack on court, therefore signifies disrespect to the sovereignty of the State, and there lies the historical justification for the assumption of special jurisdiction by superior courts as courts of record to deal with contempts by adopting summary procedure in exercise of their inherent power. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction by court is an exercise of its inherent power flowing from the sovereignty jurisdiction of the State of which it is a functional constituent existing for public good. Truly speaking, the contempt jurisdiction of the court is the confluence of the twin streams of judicial care, namely, the Court's concern for public good and its responsibility to uphold the constitutional sovereignty of the State.