SEWA SINGH Vs. K C KANUNGO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This criminal revision is for quashing the proceeding being Special Case No.12 of 1976 pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Special Court), Asansol. It appears that the petitioner a Senior Electronic Data Processing Manager of Indian Railways who is now posted at Bombay was posted at Chittaranjan Locomotive Works in 1969 as District Controller of Stores and that the offence is alleged to have been committed sometimes in 1969. It has been alleged that eight wagons loaded with steel plates and/ or cuttings were dispatched between 23-9-69 and 15-10-70 in the names of different firms which are alleged to be bogus ones and that the accused persons including the present petitioner entered into criminal conspiracy with each other and in pursuance thereto cheated the Railway Department by despatching eight wagons of new steel plates and steel plate cuttings from Chittaranjan Locomotive Works against bogus railway receipt and forwarding notes and thereby committed offences punishable under Ss. 120B/420/468/471 of the Indian Penal Code read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After completion of investigation a charge-sheet was submitted and a petition of complaint was filed before the learned Judge, Special Court on 3-9-76. It also appears that on examination of the complainant K. C. Kanungo and after hearing the submission of the prosecution, the learned Judge, Special Court took cognizance and issued processes against the accused persons including the present petitioner fixing 29-10-76 for appearance. It gave rise to Special Court Case No. 12 of 1976. After the accused persons had appeared before the learned Judge, 36 prosecution witnesses were examined during the period from 6-6-77 to 14-3-80 and a date was fixed for consideration of charge on 24-4-80. Thereafter for various reasons the charge could not be framed. On 16-3-89 the present petitioner and another accused appear to have filed petition for their discharge. By order dated 13-5-89 the learned Judge, Special Court dismissed those petitions for discharge and held that charge would be framed against the accused person as indicated in the order passed by him. But as one of the accused persons was absent the charge could not be framed and the case was adjourned to 22-6-89 for appearance of all the accused persons and drawing up of the charge. On the dates between 22-6-89 to 7-9-90 charge could not be framed and thereafter on 13-11-90 the petitioner filed the instant revisional application for quashing the entire proceeding on the ground of inordinate delay in the matter of disposal of the case and the further proceeding was stayed by this Court.

(2.) Mr. Ghose learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has argued that there has been inordinate delay in the matter of disposal of the impugned proceeding inasmuch as the same has been pending in the Court from 3-9-76 i.e. more than 14 years, though the offence is alleged to have been committed in 1969, that such inordinate delay for no fault of the present petitioner is violative of the fundamental right to speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution and is abuse of the process of the Court and that this Court in exercise of its inherent power under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should quash the entire proceeding. In support of his argument he has referred to catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and of this High Court and other High Courts. He has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Machander v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 792 : (1955 Cri LJ 1644); Mahendra Singh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 2288 :(1973 Cri LJ 1450); Hussainara Khatun v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 : (1979 Cri LJ 1036); T. V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1983 SC 361 (2): (1983 Cri LJ 481); State of Bihar v. Umashankar Kotriwal, AIR 1981 SC 641 : (1981 Cri LJ 159); Rakesh Saksena v. State, AIR 1987 SC 740 and Srinivas v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, (1988) 4 SCC 36 : (1988 Cri LJ 1803). He has also referred to the decisions of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Madheshwardhari v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Patna 324 : (1986 Cri LJ 1771) and in the case of State v. Maksudan Singh, AIR 1986 Patna 38 :(1985 Cri LJ 1782). He has also referred to the decision of the learned Judge of this Court sitting singly in the case of Sri T R. Mullick v. State, 1986 Cal Cri LR (Cal) 116, Mihir Kumar Ghose v. State of West Bengal, (1989) 1 Cal HN 538 : (1990 Cri LJ 26): Gopal Mukherjee v. State,(1991) 1 Cal HN 389 and Tarapada Dey v. State, 1991 Cal Cri LR (Cal) 188. Referring to the above mentioned decisions he has argued that since there has been delay of more than 14 years in the matter of disposal of the impugned proceeding and since no charge could be framed by the Court for 10 years after the prosecution had closed its evidence the continuation of the instant proceeding any further is violative of the fundamental right to speedy trial as enshrined in Art, 21 of the Constitution and is gross abuse of the process of the Court and that the said proceeding should be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(3.) Mr. Mukherjee learned advocate appearing for the State has resisted this revisional application. Referring to the case record he has argued that since 24-4-80 fifty five dates were fixed for hearing, that the case was adjourned on the prayer of the accused persons on twenty two dates, that case was adjourned on P.P's ground on nine dates, that Court had no power to try the case on eight dates and that the Presiding Officer was absent on six dates. He has further argued that since the major part of the delay in the matter of disposal of the case was attributable to the acts and conduct of the accused person the decisions as referred to and relied upon by Mr. Ghose have got no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Referring to unreported decision of the learned Judges of this Court sitting singly, he has submitted that a time bound programme may be drawn up by this Court and the Court below may be directed to dispose of the cases within the time schedule to be fixed by this Court.