AMARENDRA NATH DUTTA Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Right to speedy public trial has not been expressly concerned as a fundamental right in our constitution. But it has now been settled beyond doubt by a series of decisions of our Apex Court that the same right is fully covered by and our Apex court that the same right is fully covered by and comprised in Article 21 of the Constitution guaranteeing non-deprivation of life and personal liberty save according to procedure established by law. It may be that what was thought to be necessary to be articulated specifically in the 18th century American constitution is no longer so necessary to be expressed in words in this century because of the progress of human society and the change of universal outlook towards the human rights. For example, the freedom of press, which has been expressly conferred by American constitution, has not been so expressly conferred by our constitution, though it is beyond doubt that article 19 read with article 21 would obviously comprise that right also.

(2.) If right to speedy public trial is a fundamental right, and we have no doubt that it is then we have also no doubt that in this case the same right has been violated beyond measures. It appears that the F.I.R. in this case was lodged in 1975, the accused was also arrested in that very year, had to remain behind the bar as under trial prisoner for about thirty days. But the investigating agency had to take about eight years to file charge-sheet which it did only in 1983 and after the charge-sheet was filed in 1983, neither the prosecution nor the trial court could make it possible to proceed with the trial at any time before 1989 when the first witness for the prosecution was examined. We find that up till now only six witnesses for the prosecution has been examined while thirty two witnesses have been cited by the prosecution in the charge sheet. If this is what has happened during the last about fourteen years it is nobody's guess that how long it will take for the prosecution to bring the same to an end. We are therefore satisfied that any further continuance of this prosecution would be a continuous violation of the fundamental right under Article 21 and cannot be countenanced by this court. Our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner to a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in (Madheswar Dhari Singh v. State of Bihar) (AIR 1986, Patna 324) where after referring a number of Supreme Court decision on the point the Full Bench has categorically ruled and held that a criminal prosecution under section 409 of the penal code, as the case before us, is liable to be quashed on the ground of delay alone and in that case a delay was about twenty years. We do not think that this is so much the number of years, whether fourteen or twenty, but the principle and the rationale behind the same, which really matters and that principle is that no prosecution should be allowed to drag on for years and years to the prejudice of the accused unless the prosecuting agency can satisfy the court that there were compelling reasons for such delay and such delay could not be helped. We have got through the records and we have found no justification for this inordinate delay and we do not think that the accused was in any way responsible for this delay by moving against one and the other order passed in this case in the higher courts or otherwise. A perusal of the record has left no doubt in our mind that the delay which has already taken place is really very much shocking to our conscience and we cannot but quash the prosecution on this ground alone. We accordingly allow the revision and quash the criminal case No. being T.R. 19 of 1986 in the court of Third Special Court, Raigunge district West Dinajpur. The rule is made absolute.

(3.) The accused shall be discharged from the bail bond. Rule made absolute.