(1.) NOT that this court in Revision cannot examine the correctness of the finding of fact; for in that case the words "correctness" or "proproety" in the expression "correctness, legality, or propriety any finding" in Section 397 of the Code of criminal Procedure and the provision in Section 401 of the Code empowring this Court "to exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of Appeal" would stand divested of their ordinary and legitimate meaning. It should be noted that while in the Civil Jurisdiction, the powers of the Court of Revision were all along circumscribed by express words, and the 1976-Amendments of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure have clearly demonstrated the anxiety of the legislature for further circumscription, the Legislature has nevertheless, by and large, retained the expressions and provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 in respect of Criminal Revision with all their amplitude and plentitude even hit proceeded to repeal the Old code and enacted the new one in 1973.
(2.) BUT as a matter of judicial propriety, finality of the finding of facts arrived at by the first appellate Court was found to be very much desirable and it has now become almost rule of law, settled by our pre-Constitution and post-Constitution apex Courts, that a Court of criminal Revision shall not interfere with the current grant Of the courts below, unless it cannot but for grave and conpelling reasons to prevent palpable miscarriage of justice. We find the present case to be such a one.
(3.) THE accused-petitioner has been convicted and sentenced under the provisions of S. lion 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration act, 1954 for selling and storing for sale adulterated Ghee. The case consistently made out by the: accused in his cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, in his statements under Section 313 of the code of Criminal Procedure and, through the -evidence of Defence witness was that he did not sell, store 5r-otherwise deal in Ghee but was a dealer in Cloths only, that one of his customers used to keep ghee in his shop on occasions and used to sell the same outside in front of his shop and he also gave out the name and the residential address of that customer. A peculiar feature of this case was that the sole witness examined by the accused was also cited by the prosecution it self and was referred to by the Food Inspector in his deposition as the sole independent public witness and was also admitted to be the "adjacent shop-keeper".